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Abstract 
 
 To this point, research on corporate crime has been, for the most part, overlooked 
by mainstream criminology. In particular, corporate violations of safety regulations in the 
coal mining industry have yet to be studied within the field of criminology.  The purpose 
of this thesis is to examine the crimes of a coal mining corporation, a corporation whose 
business decisions led to the worst coal mining disaster in forty years, along with the 
deaths of twenty-nine men.  This thesis will utilize a case study format in order to 
illustrate the crimes committed by this corporation.  Previous literature covering the 
history of coal mining safety in the United States, the political economy of coal, and 
theoretical explanations of corporate crime will be reviewed.  The crimes detailed in this 
case study will then be explained using Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory.  The criminal 
liability of corporations, potential ways to reduce corporate crime in the coal mining 
industry, as well as limitations of this study and directions for future research in this area 
will also be discussed. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
Historically, criminology has focused on explaining the actions of common street 
criminals, who also tends to be poor. Criminologists have examined social, economic, 
genetic, and other theoretical explanations to better understand the differences between 
street offenders and non-offenders.  Following this tradition, contemporary criminology 
presents an abundance of perspectives and measures that are frequently used to explain 
the criminality of the poor and powerless.  In comparison, very little criminological 
research has examined the crimes that are being committed by the rich and powerful.  
The virtual exclusion of white-collar, corporate and environmental crime (the crimes of 
the powerful) from the mainstream criminological literature is seen as an oversight by 
many scholars (Lynch et al., 2004; Shichor, 2009; Yeager, 2009). 
Why is the study of the crimes of the powerful so important?  Most people, 
including criminologists, don’t realize the prevalence and seriousness of these crimes in 
today’s society.  In reality, the impact of the crimes of the powerful dramatically exceeds 
that of common street crimes.  Several studies have estimated the detrimental effects 
caused by these crimes (Moore, 1990; Albanese, 1995; Friedrichs, 1996; Lynch et al., 
2000).  In contrast to the conventional street crimes that you hear about nearly every time 
you watch the evening news, the crimes of the powerful remain hidden from the public’s 
view, affecting the public’s perceptions of crime.  By constantly running stories on street 
crime and excluding the occurrences of white collar crime, the media has trained the 
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public to be more interested in hearing about the double homicide by a crazed killer, than 
the two construction workers who were killed in an “accident” while using faulty 
equipment.  Ratings and sales are offered as reasons for why the media is more likely to 
run the story about the masked bank robber who got away with $20,000, instead of the 
bank’s president who embezzled $2 million.  But no matter the reason, the media has 
always disproportionately emphasized street crime compared to white collar crime 
(Graber, 1980).  By doing this the media is responsible for influencing the public’s 
perception of what a “typical” criminal looks like: this persona is often characterized as 
being psychologically flawed, non-white, and of lower class.  The American public has 
been taught through media exposure to be cautious of people matching this description. 
However, the hidden truth is that unlike the common street crimes committed by these 
“typical” criminals, virtually every American has been the victim of some sort of crime 
committed by the powerful, which mostly consists of individuals who are sane, white, 
and of the wealthiest class.  For example, every tax-paying citizen in the United States 
was forced to pay higher taxes as a result of the savings and loan scandals (Lynch et al., 
2004, p. 391). 
In addition, the costs associated with the crimes of the powerful are significantly 
higher than the costs of conventional street crime.  The numbers vary, but researchers 
have estimated that the annual economic losses due to white collar crime in the U.S. are 
around $200 billion at the low end (Albanese, 1995, p.85), and up to $400 billion per year 
at the high end (Lynch et al., 2000, p.66).  When you consider that fraud in the health 
care industry alone was responsible for the annual loss of $100 billion twenty years ago 
(Thompson, 1992), the actual costs of these crimes are probably closer to the higher end 
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of this spectrum.  No matter the exact cost of white collar and corporate crime, we know 
that the corresponding cost of street crime is far less.  Experts have estimated the annual 
cost of street crimes at nearly $10 billion, twenty to forty times less than the cost of white 
collar and corporate crime.   
However, the costs of white collar and corporate crime are not always financially-
based; the violent nature of corporate crime is often disguised in the form of “accidents” 
(Lynch et al., 2004).  On average, there are approximately 15,000 homicides in the 
United States every year.  However, Simon (1999, p. 39) estimated that each year, 
roughly 100,000 U.S. workers were killed by either injuries suffered at the workplace or 
illnesses contracted from their jobsite.  Additional estimates by Reiman (1998) revealed 
that an average of 16,000 people each year die from unnecessary surgeries, and an 
additional 20,000 deaths are the result of inadequate medical care.  The dark figure of 
white collar and corporate crime is certainly much larger than that of street crime with 
countless other deaths resulting from the corporate manufacture of hazardous products, 
and environmental pollution.  All things considered, the prevalence and impact of the 
crimes of the powerful on our society is much more significant than that of typical street 
crime (Lynch et al., 2004).    
White-collar and corporate crime in general is understudied and research 
examining workers’ safety in the coal mining industry is almost non-existent.  Most of 
the work done in this area focuses on crimes committed by the coal industry against the 
environment (e.g. Stretesky & Lynch, 2011).  Although several sociologists and political 
scientists have examined issues regarding the coal mining industry and enforcement of 
safety regulations (Braithwaite, 1985; Lewis-Beck & Alford, 1980), to this point no one 
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in the field of criminology has examined the phenomena of corporate crime in the coal 
mining industry as it relates to workers’ safety.  This is a significant omission given the 
significant death and injury rates in that industry.  For example, it has been reported that 
since 1900, more than 103,000 miners have died while working in coal mines in the 
United States, and another 1,750,000 miners have suffered disabling injuries.  This 
estimate excluded the more than 1,500 former miners that are estimated to die from black 
lung disease every year (Goodell, 2006, p. 53).   
Many times the death of a worker is the result of a true accident or an 
unpredictable occurrence based solely on chance.  However, sometimes the death of a 
worker is not an accident, but instead is the consequence of a preventable, and at times 
even a predictable event.  In this circumstance, the responsibility for such an occurrence 
is transformed: whereas no one can be blamed for an accident, specific persons, even in 
their capacities as representatives of disembodied corporations, can and should be held 
legally responsible for the consequences of a preventable event.   
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the crimes of a corporation, a coal 
corporation whose business decisions led to a preventable and predictable disaster, along 
with the deaths of twenty-nine men.  The next chapter will provide a case study of the 
Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, which has yet to be examined in the field of 
criminology as an instance of corporate crime.  Chapter three provides a review of the 
history of coal mining safety in the United States and a description of the political 
economy of coal in West Virginia.  Chapter four will focus on theoretical explanations of 
corporate crime, including the scholarly foundations, and current criminological theories 
related to corporate crime.  Chapter five will offer a theoretical explanation for the Upper 
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Big Branch Mine disaster using Robinson and Murphy’s (2009) Contextual 
Anomie/Strain Theory.  Finally, chapter six will conclude with a discussion regarding 
potential ways to reduce the amount of crime committed by corporations in the coal 
mining industry, as well as limitations of this study and directions for future research on 
corporate crime in this area. 
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Chapter Two:  A Case Study 
 
The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster 
At approximately 3:02 p.m. on April 5th, 2010, a series of massive explosions 
ripped through the Upper Big Branch Mine located in southern West Virginia.  A chain 
of enormous fireballs rocketed through two and half miles of underground workspace 
killing twenty-nine miners and seriously injuring another.  This incident was the worst 
mining disaster in the United States since 1970.   
On April 13th, 2010, then West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin III asked J. Davitt 
McAteer, former Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of the federal Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA), to conduct a state funded independent investigation into 
the causes of the disaster.  McAteer assembled an investigation team of colleagues with 
expertise in coal mining, mining law, mining communities, occupational safety and 
public health.  After more than a year long inquiry the investigation report was released 
on May 19th, 2011, finding mine owner, Massey Energy, and the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration directly responsible for the catastrophe.  The following chapter is based 
on that report. 
The Aftermath of the Explosion 
Following the explosion and leading up to the investigation, Massey Energy’s 
officials stood by their assertion that the explosion was caused by a massive and 
unforeseen inundation of methane or natural gas from a crack in the mine floor.  
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According to Massey this was an incident that could not be predicted or prevented, and 
was simply one of the uncontrollable dangers of coal mining that every miner knows 
about when s/he takes the job.  However, every mine explosion leaves behind a footprint 
that offers clues to investigators about details regarding the origin of the blast and how it 
spread, and the footprint left behind in the Upper Big Branch Mine tells a different story 
than the one the officials at Massey reported.  It tells the story of an explosion that started 
with the ignition of a small amount of methane gas which was then fueled by coal dust 
that had been allowed to build up for miles throughout the mine.  
No eyewitnesses survived that could testify as to the exact circumstances of what 
transpired just before the disaster; however, the evidence left behind from the explosions 
allowed the investigators to draw the following conclusions.  It started with a spark, as 
the operator of the shearer cut into the sandstone top of the longwall.  When machinery 
cuts into coal, there is usually very little sparking because the coal is soft. However, when 
shearer bits hit the rocks that sometime surround or are embedded in the coal, sparks will 
fly.  On this occasion the sparks ignited a pocket of methane gas that had likely risen 
from the floor or had migrated from a previously mined area located behind the longwall.  
The shearer was equipped with water sprays that are designed to douse flames such as 
these at the point of ignition. The investigative report, however, noted that tests of this 
equipment by the investigators determined that the sprays on the shearer were ineffective 
because many of them had either been removed or were clogged.  The crew working the 
longwall found themselves utterly helpless to stop the flame from transforming into a 
massive fireball as it ignited the coal dust that had been allowed to build up throughout 
the mine.  As the flame propagated, it formed the shape of a wedge that grew enough to 
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reach from the roof all the way down to the floor.  The explosions spread so quickly that 
within a matter of seconds, two and a half miles of underground workspace were 
completely scorched (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 13-16). 
The explosion was reported in the media as a single event; however, what actually 
took place was a series of blasts that occurred within milliseconds of each other, in such 
rapid succession that they did in fact sound like a single explosion.  The secondary 
explosions were created by the compressed air of the initial blast forcing the coal dust to 
become airborne.  Therefore, the explosion generated its own fuel with the air/dust 
mixture behaving like a line of gunpowder carrying the blast onward throughout the mine 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 23). 
The investigators concluded that the explosion was the result of three failures by 
Massey Energy in basic coal mining safety practices that are identified and codified to 
protect the lives of miners.  First, water sprays on the company’s equipment were not 
properly maintained and consequently failed to function in extinguishing the small 
ignition that led to the massive explosion.  Second, the company failed to meet federal 
and state safety principal standards for the application of rock dust.  As a result, the 
accumulated coal dust provided the fuel that allowed the explosion to propagate 
throughout the mine.  Finally, the company’s ventilation system did not adequately 
ventilate the mine, allowing explosive gases to build up far beyond the legal levels 
(McAteer et al., 2011). 
Working with faulty equipment.  It is very apparent that at the Upper Big 
Branch Mine (UBBM) the maintenance of safety equipment was not a priority.  The poor 
condition of various types of equipment used in the mining operation provides a clear 
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example of the inattention that was paid to maintaining a safe workplace.  A poorly 
maintained top of the line shearer, broken rock dusters and defective airlock doors, are 
just a few examples.  The lack of maintenance on the shearer (an electrically-driven 
machine commonly used in coal mining for making vertical cuts in the coal) was a direct 
cause of the deadly explosion.  During the investigation, MSHA testing of the shearer 
found that water sprays were either clogged or missing.  In addition, the MSHA found 
worn bits on the machine exposing steel shafts, which would have increased the danger 
of sparking when the bits hit rock.  To make matters worse, testing done by the MSHA 
on December 20, 2010, revealed that the water lines on the longwall were inadequate to 
supply enough water to the shearer needed to suppress the fire in the first place.  The 
miners had absolutely no way of protecting themselves once that first spark flew 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 23). 
 The large amount of faulty equipment in use at the UBBM is further evidenced by 
the numerous post-explosion violations and orders written by the MSHA during their 
investigation.  The MSHA cited that mantrips, the vehicles used to transport workers, 
were in terrible condition, and that the main track haulage had not been maintained in 
many areas throughout the mine.  Many different pieces of equipment throughout the 
mine had built in methane detectors, which would alert the miners when they were 
working in areas that had dangerously high levels of methane gas. However testimony 
from the miners suggested that many of these detectors had been disabled or “bridged 
out”, so that there would be no halt in production to make repairs when methane detectors 
indicated high methane levels.  A violation of state and federal law, this practice of 
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equipment disabling puts workers in constant danger and may have resulted in this lethal 
explosion (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 99). 
Coal dust and rock dust.  Rock dust, or crushed limestone, has long been 
regarded as a vital safety component in underground mines because it is used to dilute the 
explosive nature of coal dust.  However, this relatively large mine had only one two-man 
crew assigned to spread rock dust, and it wasn’t even their fulltime job.  The senior 
member of this crew explained that he was often pulled off his dusting duties to work on 
other construction projects such as building stoppings, setting timbers and delivering 
supplies to different sections.   
The UBBM used a track mounted pod duster to spread rock dust throughout the 
working sections and construction sites in the mine.  All of the investigators agreed that 
the efficient use of a track duster in a mine as large as the UBBM would have required 
drilling a borehole midway in the mine near the working sections.  This borehole would 
have allowed the speedy delivery of bulk rock dust used to refill the pod duster. No such 
borehole existed at the UBBM likely because of the cost required to create one.  As a 
result, when the rock dust crew would run out of dust they were forced to take the pod 
duster all the way back outside the mine in order to refill it.  The nearly two-hour round 
trip required to refill the pod duster likely meant that only one tank of dust was being 
applied in the mine per day.  Realizing the dangers created by the lack of rock dusting, 
miners took it among themselves to spread rock dust throughout the mine.  The miners 
testified that, using 40-pound bags of rock dust that were transported to the sections on 
flat cars, they spread rock dust by hand on the floors and walls of working sections.  
However, the major flaw with this method was that the roof was never dusted, as required 
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by law, because the miners testified that dusting along the roof made it very difficult for 
them to breathe (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 50-52).  
Dusting, which was already a challenging process for the two-man crew because 
of the large size of the mine was made even more difficult by the fact that the pod duster 
used at the UBBM didn’t work properly much of the time.  The senior member of the 
dusting crew explained to investigators that, “Sometimes it would clog up, so we would 
have to spend 30 minutes trying to unclog the hoses … then it would clog up again” 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p.50).  Testimony from the other member of the crew confirmed 
the state of the duster: “It would break a lot … you had to twist all the knobs just right” 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p.50).  It was not surprising that the two-man crew had trouble 
with the pod duster, which was prone to failure because of its age and the fact that it had 
not been properly maintained.  The lack of maintenance on the pod duster was 
immediately apparent to investigators.  After the explosion, Massey employees tried to 
use the duster to perform dusting required by the MSHA.  They could not, however, 
finish because the motor burned up on their first attempt.  Documents obtained from the 
manufacturer revealed that by 2010, the duster was more than 25 years old and had not 
been rebuilt for at least seven years (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 50-52). 
In order for the Upper Big Branch Mine to have met the minimum rock dusting 
standards specified in state and federal regulations, management should have assigned a 
two-man crew solely to rock dusting on at least two shifts each day, and preferably on all 
three shifts.  Yet at the UBBM a two-man crew was responsible for dusting the entire 
mine on a part-time basis with no set schedule and with faulty equipment.  The age and 
poor condition of the dusting equipment along with the fact the UBBM did not have an 
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established rock dusting crew that followed a consistent schedule, indicates that rock 
dusting was not a priority at the UBBM in the early months of 2010. 
Further evidence of inadequate rock dusting is revealed in state and federal 
citation records.  During 2009, mining inspectors with the West Virginia Office of 
Miners’ Health Safety and Training (WVMHST) issued 26 citations at the UBBM for 
coal dust accumulation and for failure to adequately apply rock dust.  In the fifteen 
months prior to the disaster, the UBBM received citations from federal or state inspectors 
every month.  These violations were observed in every working section of the mine, 
including the longwall.  Of the 40 citations issued by the MSHA for rock dusting 
violations, nearly half of them were classified as “significant and substantial” (McAteer 
et al., 2011, p. 54). 
Since the disaster, Massey Energy officials have stated that coal dust played no 
part in the explosion at the UBBM.  The general counsel for the company, Shayne 
Harvey, told the Associated Press that the mine “appears to have been very well rock 
dusted” (McAteer et al., 2011, p.55).  However, the combined evidence from a number of 
sources strongly suggests otherwise: the many witnesses who testified to the lack of 
dusting in the mine; the series of citations issued by state and federal officials in the year 
leading up to the disaster; the absence of a systematic rock dust procedure; the frequent 
changes in rock dust personnel; the fact that rock dust crews were given other 
assignments; the physical distance the explosion traveled; and the findings from the rock 
dust samples taken after the explosion.   
Had coal dust not been a factor in the explosion, the damage sustained at the 
UBBM may have been contained to the longwall area.  The victims on Headgate 22 were 
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located nearly 0.75 miles from the longwall.  Other victims on the mantrip were found 
about 1.15 miles from the longwall face.  The fact that the explosion killed men working 
so far away from the initial blast provides strong evidence that coal dust played a 
significant role in propagating the blast throughout the mine.  It is very apparent that the 
historic lessons of previous coal mining disasters were either forgotten or just completely 
ignored by the management of the UBBM (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 55).  
The air down there.  A mine’s ventilation system is designed to continually push 
fresh air throughout the mine, prevent the buildup of methane and other toxic gases, and 
reduce the amount of coal dust.  The ventilation system used at the UBBM is referred to 
as a push-pull system; air is pushed into the mine by the “North Portal” fan and is pulled 
throughout the mine by the “Bandytown” fan.  Once the air has traveled its intended path 
it exits the mine through several return entries and out the main return shaft.  However, 
the push-pull ventilation system at the UBBM suffered from a serious design flaw.  The 
fans were configured to push air in a straight line throughout the mine even though many 
miners worked in areas away from this horizontal path.  As a result, the air had to be 
diverted from its natural flow pattern into the working sections along the longwall.  
Adding to this challenge was the fact that the two main working sections, Headgate 22 
and Tailgate 22, were located on opposite sides of the mine, which resulted in the 
construction of multiple ventilation controls that were often in competition with one 
another.  A common phrase among miners was “bring the air with you”, because as many 
workers confirmed, when the Tailgate 22 section was receiving sufficient air the 
Headgate 22 section had very low airflow, and vice versa: when the air conditions were 
good at Headgate 22, the opposite was always true at Tailgate 22.  This competition for 
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air at the UBBM led to a dangerous practice of ad hoc modifications to the ventilation 
system by foremen that were concerned with providing enough air for their crews.  These 
changes included unauthorized adjustments to many “ventilation controls” throughout the 
mine (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 60-61).  
The fans used at the UBBM did have a sufficient capacity to adequately ventilate 
the large mine.  However, the challenge of ventilating such an expansive mine is that the 
air must be directed through multiple “ventilation controls” in order sufficiently ventilate 
all the areas of the mine.  Fresh air can be directed throughout a mine using several 
different types of ventilation controls including stoppings, overcasts, regulators, seals and 
airlock doors.  The location, construction and maintenance of these ventilation controls is 
critical to the proper functioning of a mine’s ventilation system.   
At the UBBM evidence of missing, broken, and poorly constructed controls added 
additional problems to an already ineffective ventilation system.  More importantly 
however, state, federal, and independent investigators were all in agreement that the 
UBBM had too many airlock doors.  The purpose of airlock doors are to prevent the 
mine’s intended air flow from being disrupted as people and equipment enter or move 
into different areas of the mine.   However, one of the problems with using air lock doors 
is that the intended air flow can be disrupted if doors are left open for an extended period 
of time.  Miners testified that in an effort to provide more air to their working areas they 
frequently forced airlock doors to remain open in addition to altering regulators such as 
stoppings.  The miners’ testimony also indicated that many of the airlock doors were not 
properly maintained, which also resulted in air leakage (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 60-61).   
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Management at the UBBM likely chose to use airlock doors instead of overcasts 
due to the fact that airlock doors can be installed faster and at less cost to the operator.  
Management personnel also knew that the overall ventilation plan designed by engineers 
was not being followed correctly, but continued to push foremen to keep their crews 
working to produce more coal.  In early January 2010 an MSHA inspector noted that the 
company’s senior management officials showed a “reckless disregard” for workers’ 
safety when they told a foreman to ignore a citation the mine had received for faulty 
ventilation. 
Ventilation systems also play an important role in limiting the amount of coal dust 
that is allowed to build up in the air.  Circulation of fresh air prevents the air from 
stagnating and becoming saturated with coal dust.  Evidence from the autopsies of the 29 
men revealed just how bad air conditions were at the UBBM.  Coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis (CWP), also called black lung disease, develops from the prolonged 
inhalation of coal mine dust, which is deposited into the lungs.  It is a chronic, fibrotic, 
and irreversible disease that robs miners of their breath and eventually their life.  
However, CWP is entirely preventable with the proper use of dust control measures 
including proper ventilation, water sprays and dust collectors (all three of which were 
compromised at the UBBM).  All twenty-nine men who lost their lives in the explosion 
underwent lung examinations during their autopsies, which were necessary to determine 
the presence or absence of CWP.  Of the 29 victims, five did not have sufficient lung 
tissue available to make a determination relating to CWP.  Of the remaining 24 victims, 
seventeen (or 71 percent) of the men had CWP.  This compares with the national 
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prevalence rate of 3.2 percent among active underground miners with CWP, and a rate of 
7.6 percent in West Virginia (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 32).   
The result of a failing ventilation system and the mine’s management being 
unwilling to fix the problem led to the build-up of methane gas, which provided the fuel 
for the initial explosion.  Methane gas is a natural by-product of decomposing organic 
matter and is the most hazardous gas found in underground mines.  The dangers of 
methane gas are well known in the mining community, and since 1925 methane gas has 
contributed to more than 10,000 miner deaths in the United States.  However, in today’s 
modern age of mining technology and safety practices, small methane ignitions should 
not turn into major explosions.  These events are rare among mine operators that adhere 
to basic safety measures, such as maintaining adequate ventilation systems, removing 
explosive coal dust from mining operations, spreading required amounts of rock dust and 
ensuring that water sprays on mining equipment are kept in good repair and function 
properly.  Massey’s affirmation that this catastrophe was an unpreventable happenstance 
is completely false; because the aforementioned safety systems failed at the UBBM, a 
minor flare-up of methane gas led to the nation’s worst coal mining disaster in forty years 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 67).  
Massey Energy:  A History of Danger 
At the time of the explosion at the UBBM, Massey Energy was the fourth leading 
coal producer in the United States and the largest in the Appalachian region, producing 
nearly 40 million tons of coal each year from underground and surface mines in Virginia, 
West Virginia and Kentucky.  Massey Energy is well known for their environmental 
violations, causing immeasurable damage to the mountains, streams and air in the 
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coalfields.  They have created health risks for coalfield residents by polluting streams, 
injecting coal slurry into the ground, and failing to control coal waste dams and dust 
emissions from processing plants.  For example, in 2000, Massey Energy was responsible 
for what the Environmental Protection Agency has referred to as the largest 
environmental catastrophe in the history of the southeastern United States.  The Martin 
County slurry spill, which resulted in the release of more than 300 million gallons of 
sludge into Appalachian streams, covered seventy-five miles of the Big Sandy River with 
black sludge, killing 1.6 million fish, washing away roads, and contaminating the water 
supplies of more than 27,000 people.  However, Massey has also had a very poor history 
regarding safety inside their coal mines (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 92).   
Following the explosion at the UBBM, American University’s School of 
Communications released a detailed report on Massey Energy’s safety record.  This 
report was based on data that had been collected from various public sources including 
the MSHA’s on-line database.  Findings from their study revealed that from 2000 to 
2010, among all U.S. coal companies, Massey Energy had the worst fatality record.  
During this time period, a total of fifty-four workers were killed in Massey mines, 
including the 29 men who lost their lives on April 5th, and another two men whom died at 
other mines after the UBBM disaster.  In response to the report, Massey president Don 
Blankenship claims that these numbers were average among the larger coal mining 
companies.  “If you look at the number of fatals, we’re a big producer, so absolute 
numbers when you’re producing 40 million tons a year tend to get big, even with your 
best efforts,” said Blankenship (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 93).  However, according to the 
American University investigators, Blankenship’s assertion about the other high 
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producing coal companies is completely false.  For example, the nation’s largest coal 
producer, Peabody Energy, had only six fatalities occur during the same ten year time 
period.  In terms of production, Massey Energy averaged 17.5 million tons of coal per 
fatality, whereas Peabody Energy averaged 296 million tons of coal per fatality.            
In addition, American University’s investigation of Massey’s safety record from 
2000 to 2010 revealed that Massey had been cited for 62,923 violations, including 25,612 
that were considered significant and substantial.  During that 10-year time period, the 
MSHA proposed $49.9 million in fines against Massey, which was $15 million more than 
any other company (McAteer et al., 2011, p.93). 
The disaster at the UBBM is not the first time an incident has occurred at a 
Massey owned mine which has been suspected of reckless disregard for safety standards.  
In 2006, federal, state and independent investigators determined that a fire in Massey’s 
Aracoma Alma Mine #1, which killed two miners, was the result of negligent mining 
practices.  The fire was caused by a spark from a misaligned conveyor belt which ignited 
combustible materials that had been allowed to build up alongside the conveyor belt.  
Following their investigation, the MSHA determined that the company had failed to 
adhere to such basic safety regulations such as performing safety inspections, installing a 
sprinkler system and maintaining a water supply that could have been utilized to combat 
the fire.  However, the most serious safety violations involved the removal of stoppings, 
and other ventilation controls, which allowed the fire to spread and block the miners’ 
primary escape route.    
As a result of the investigations, federal indictments were issued against the 
Aracoma Coal Company (the company in charge of operating the mine and a subsidiary 
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of Massey Energy).  The company entered guilty pleas to ten criminal violations of mine 
safety law related to the fatal fire and agreed to the payment of $2.5 million in criminal 
fines.  In addition, the MSHA issued more than 1,300 citations against the company for 
the violations of federal mine safety laws and regulations, which ended up costing 
Massey Energy another $1.7 million in civil penalties.  The $4.2 million in combined 
penalties is the largest fine amount imposed on a coal company in the history of federal 
coal mining safety enforcement (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 92-93). 
To make matters worse for Massey, four years after the Aracoma fire, information 
surfaced which indicated that Blankenship was aware of the problems occurring at the 
Aracoma mine prior to the fire.  On April 17, 2010, a reporter for The Charleston (WV) 
Gazette by the name of Ken Ward, Jr., revealed evidence that Blankenship had sent one 
of his own inspectors to examine the condition of the conveyor belt at the Aracoma mine.  
Ward exposed a memo between Blankenship and his inspector, in which the inspector 
had informed Blankenship that the conveyor belt’s condition was a serious safety hazard. 
Most importantly, the memo was dated January 13, 2006, just six days before the fire 
broke out at the Aracoma mine. 
Upon the discovery of this new evidence, the issue of a new trial was brought to 
Logan County Circuit Judge Roger Perry, who ruled that the memo could be used in civil 
actions against Massey by the miners who had survived the fire.  The widows of the two 
miners who had died in the fire were excluded because they had previously brought a 
separate civil suit against Massey in 2008, which had been settled for an undisclosed 
amount.  In October of 2010, Massey once again settled with nine of the miners for an 
undisclosed sum (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 92-93).       
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Massey Energy would like to have everyone believe that the disaster which 
occurred at the UBBM on April 5th, 2010 was a freak incident, and that occurrences such 
as these are very rare events at Massey-owned mines.  However, the company’s history 
shows us that this is not the case.  What makes this incident so troublesome is that it 
appears that Massey had learned nothing from their past safety issues, and that all the 
miners who had perished before April of 2010, had died in vain.  Many of the safety 
violations that caused the fire at the Aracoma mine reflected the same problems being 
experienced at the UBBM, and with no effort by management to address these violations, 
history was soon to repeat itself, this time taking the lives of twenty-nine men. 
The Role of the MSHA    
Throughout the report Massey Energy is strongly condemned by the investigators 
for multiple failures to meet basic safety standards outlined in the Mine Safety Act of 
1977.  However, the investigators claimed that the U.S Department of Labor and its Mine 
Safety and Health Administration were equally at fault for failing to act decisively after 
Massey was issued 515 citations for safety violations at the UBBM in 2009. The report 
criticizes MSHA inspectors for failing to issue a flagrant violation citation which could 
have fined the company up to $220,000.  The McAteer investigators claimed that this 
citation was entirely necessary based on Massey’s failure to meet basic safety standards 
and the investigators found it “disturbing” that the violation was not issued.  The failure 
to issue this flagrant violation citation was compounded by the fact that the MSHA also 
failed to notify the miners and their families that they were working in a mine which had 
not met minimal safety requirements.  The investigators were concerned that the MSHA 
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neglected to use its regulatory authority to enforce improvements on the mine may have 
been the result of Massey’s political power (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 76-77). 
In the days and months following the disaster at the UBBM, officials with the 
MSHA repeatedly defended their agency’s performance.  They were quick to point to the 
fact that the Mine Safety Act places the duty for providing a safe workplace squarely on 
the shoulders of the employer, insisting that the operator is ultimately responsible for 
operating a safe mine.  While this is true, once again it is not the whole story.   
Anyone who has studied the history of occupational health and safety here in the 
United States knows that merely having laws on the books has never been enough to 
ensure workers’ safety.  As McAteer explains in his report, the government’s duty to 
enforce those laws “is a hard-earned right that has been paid for with the blood of coal 
miners” (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 76).  However, the goals embedded in mine health and 
safety regulations have the potential to narrow an operator’s profit margin, therefore it is 
not uncommon for some mine owners to sometimes try and evade, ignore or sidestep 
those regulations.  As a result, miners need a strong watchdog to ensure that a company’s 
drive for profit is not allowed to overshadow workers’ rights to a safe workplace.  For 
coal miners in the United States, that watchdog at the federal level is the MSHA. 
The MSHA receives a substantial annual appropriation from Congress (in fiscal 
year 2010, the appropriation was $357.3 million) to issue regulations and ensure that 
mine operators comply with them.  Located in 92 duty stations throughout the country, 
the agency has 2,300 employees that are responsible for inspecting coal mines and other 
operations, including stone quarries, metal mines and dredging operations.  The MSHA is 
in charge of monitoring a variety of mandates on mine operators, these include 
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requirements to submit and receive approval on engineering plans for ventilation, and 
dust control, as well as for training and emergency response plans.  MSHA officials are 
authorized to enter mine property at will and are required to complete mine inspections 
four times a year at every underground mine, two times a year at every surface mine, and 
spot inspections every five days at mines that liberate excessive quantities of methane 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 76). 
A mine inspector’s job is by no means simple.  The best mine inspectors have 
very keen eyes and ears, they know regulations inside-out, they can quickly grasp the 
mine’s ventilation and other engineering plans, and they thoroughly document their 
observations.  Mine inspector’s must also have thick skin because they spend days in the 
mine with the very company officials they cite for safety violations, in effect indicating 
that the officials are not doing their job and as a result their company will be fined 
accordingly.  The inspectors are also responsible for returning to the mine to ensure that 
all safety violations have been addressed and that the mine’s management is complying 
with regulations (McAteer et al., 2011, pp.76-77). 
The mine inspector’s job proves to be even more difficult when working with 
companies such as Massey Energy, which never passes up the opportunity to challenge 
inspectors’ enforcement actions by disputing findings and arguing about what the law 
requires.  According to witness testimony, Massey’s Vice President for Safety, Elizabeth 
Chamberlin, took a violation written by an inspector, looked at her colleagues and said, 
“Don’t worry, we’ll litigate it away” (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 77).    
 Realizing that some companies are more likely to press the boundaries of safe 
practices, Congress gave the MSHA the power to establish a “pattern of violation (POV)” 
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category to address mine operators who are cited continuously for “significant and 
substantial (S&S)” violations.  The MSHA was also given the authority to determine 
what constitutes a pattern of violation, and the agency is responsible for notifying mine 
operators when they fall into this category.  Under current law, mines are subject to a 
POV sanction when they meet ten criteria indicating that the mine is a habitual violator of 
mine safety laws.  According to the MSHA, after the mine has been placed on a POV 
status, any S&S violation issued by an inspector within 90 days will result in miners 
being ordered out of the affected area.  However, this tool had never been officially used 
by the MSHA until April of 2011, when two coal mines were placed on the POV status, 
although no miners were ever pulled out of the mines.   
It wasn’t until after the Sago Mine disaster in 2006, and the deaths of twelve 
miners, that attention was brought to the unused POV provisions of the Mine Safety Act.  
In response to this tragedy the MSHA began notifying operators that had a “potential” 
pattern of violation. This strategy of notifying mine operators before they reached the 
POV status proved to be effective.   According to the Department of Labor, once a mine 
is notified that they may be subject to a POV sanction, mines reduced future citations of 
serious problems by 72 percent.  In 2007, twenty mines throughout the country were sent 
warning letters, four of those mines were owned by Massey Energy, including the Upper 
Big Branch Mine.  However, none of these mines received tougher sanctions because 
once they reduced their violation rates, they were taken off the “potential pattern of 
violation” list.  After this warning the level of serious violations dropped at the UBBM, 
however in 2009 offending spiked again reaching an all-time high at the mine (McAteer 
et al., 2011, pp. 76-78).  
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By simply examining MSHA statistics it is very obvious that federal officials 
were kept extremely busy at the UBBM.  In 2009 alone, federal inspectors spent 1,854 
hours at the mine – the equivalent of 231 eight hour work days, or 46 full time work 
weeks.  These data indicate that the amount of time inspectors spent at the UBBM had 
doubled since 2007.  During 2009, inspectors wrote 515 citations at the UBBM, and 39 
percent of these citations were for significant and substantial violations.  In addition, 
inspectors issued another 124 citations during the early months of 2010 prior to the 
explosion.  The MSHA also issued 48 withdrawal orders at the UBBM – a rate that is 
nearly 19 times the national average - for these repeated violations.    The associated 
monetary penalties proposed for these violations totaled almost $1.1 million.  
Nonetheless, all of the investigators agreed that stricter action should have been taken by 
the MSHA at the UBBM (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 77). 
There were several other provisions to the MINER Act passed in the aftermath of 
the 2006 Sago Mine disaster, which gave the MSHA new enforcement tools with more 
stringent sanctions to use against mine operators who were considered repeat offenders.  
Most importantly, the MSHA was now authorized to issue “flagrant” violations, 
associated with fines of up to $220,000, against companies which repeatedly failed “to 
make reasonable efforts to eliminate a known violation of a mandatory health or safety 
standard that … reasonably could have been expected to cause death or serious bodily 
injury” (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 77).  During the past five years, the MSHA have issued 
more than 125 flagrant violations, resulting in $19.5 million in fines.  However, even 
though the UBBM had been cited numerous times in 2009 for violating ventilation plan 
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requirements and rock dusting standards, the MSHA never issued a flagrant violation 
against the UBBM. 
Investigators found it apparent that the MSHA failed to use all the necessary tools 
at its disposal to ensure that the company was compliant with federal safety laws.  
Questions were immediately raised against the MSHA as to why a mine like the UBBM, 
that had such a blatant history of safety violations in 2009, had not been placed on POV 
status.  The MSHA claimed that the UBBM would have been placed into a potential POV 
status in October of 2009 had it not been for an error in one of their computer programs.  
As for why the MSHA failed to issue the UBBM any flagrant violations, an MSHA 
spokesperson said that it is a matter being examined by the MSHA’s “internal review” 
team.  However, it is also a matter being examined by the FBI, which launched an 
investigation into possible criminal wrongdoing at the mine, including criminal 
negligence and possible bribery of federal regulators (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 77-78). 
Response to the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster 
The Upper Big Branch Mine disaster elicited a quick response from the federal 
government.  Nine days after the explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine, U.S. 
Representative George Miller, chair of the House Education and Labor Committee, 
released a list of forty-eight mines throughout the United States that had been identified 
by federal mine safety officials in August of 2009 for increased scrutiny, but had not been 
targeted due to unresolved appeals filed by mine operators.  Of the forty-eight mines on 
the list, nineteen were underground coal mines located in West Virginia.  Six of the 
nineteen mines were owned by Massey Energy, including the Upper Big Branch mine 
(Mosk, 2010).   
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Once a mine is notified by the MSHA that they may be under a pattern of 
violation, the mine must take immediate actions to reduce future violations or they can 
face severe sanctions including mine closure.  The list released by Chairman Miller 
contains those forty-eight mines that would have received this notice for a pattern of 
violation in October of 2009 if it had not been for contested violations.  The 515 citations 
issued to the UBBM in 2009 should have been enough to place the mine in POV status 
and have the mine shut down, however Massey Energy contested 179 of those violations, 
and only violations that are fully resolved can be counted against the mine towards a 
pattern of violation sanction.  The contested violations are part of a huge backlog of over 
16,000 unresolved cases at the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.    
Mining companies have challenged a greater percentage of penalties since the MSHA 
began increasing their enforcement efforts in response to the 2006 Sago Mine disaster, 
and the commission has stated that it doesn’t have enough staff to handle the increase in 
appeals.  Miller claims that the reason why these mines were never shut down is because 
the companies running the mines were intentionally appealing citations in order to 
prolong the review process and bog down the agency.  “Mine operators who game the 
system to avoid tough scrutiny by federal safety officials must be held accountable,” said 
Miller (Ward, 2010). 
The mining companies on the other hand, argue that they have a legal right to 
contest penalties that they think are unfair.  Although it is not surprising to discover that 
most of the citations the coal companies contest as being unfair are the same ones that 
carry the most expensive fines.  For example, the 179 citations contested by Massey at 
the UBBM is almost 35 percent of the total number of citations for that year. Those 
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citations account for nearly 68 percent of the monetary penalties imposed against the 
UBBM.       
Even President Barack Obama voiced in on the issue stating that part of the blame 
for the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster lay with a failure of government oversight, and in 
response initiated an investigation into the tragedy by members of his own 
administration.  In his declaration, Obama reaffirmed his message, “We owe the people 
of West Virginia more than our prayers.  We owe them action … They ought to know 
that behind them there is a company that’s doing what it takes to protect them, and a 
government that is looking out for their safety.”  In the case of the Upper Big Branch 
Mine, it would appear that neither of these existed (Shear & Mufson, 2010).  
The first criminal prosecution of a Massey Energy employee occurred one year 
after the disaster in April of 2011, when a former miner at the UBBM by the name of 
Thomas Harrah, pled guilty to forging documents and making false statements to the FBI 
and MSHA in an attempt to pass himself off as a mine foreman.  Both of the charges 
were felonies, and in September of 2011, Harrah was sentenced to 9 months in jail 
(Ward, 2011). 
The very next month, Massey Energy’s Security Chief at the Upper Big Branch 
Mine, Hughie Stover, was convicted by a federal jury of making false statements to 
federal agents and obstructing a federal investigation into the cause of the UBBM 
disaster.  The investigators discovered that Stover had participated in the cover-up of 
longstanding safety problems at the mine by ordering the destruction of thousands of 
security documents in reference to the UBBM.  Stover also falsely informed the 
investigators that Massey Energy did not have a policy of alerting mine operators and 
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foreman when safety inspectors arrived at the mine.  Through the testimony of several 
former security guards at the site and dispatchers in the mine office, investigators 
exposed the company’s sophisticated methods of alerting the underground crews when 
inspectors made unannounced visits.  On many occasions, Stover himself had actually 
been involved in the use of radios and underground strobe lights to warn miners of the 
inspectors’ presence.  Stover remains free on bail as he awaits his sentencing hearing, 
however Stover faces up to 25 years in prison and U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin has 
stated that they will be asking for the maximum sentence (Ward, 2012). 
On February 22, 2012, former mine superintendent at the UBBM, Gary May, 
became the highest ranking Massey Energy official to receive criminal charges thus far.  
May was charged with conspiracy to defraud the federal government’s mine safety 
enforcement efforts, in an effort to cover up dangerous working conditions in the UBBM 
prior to the April explosion.  In the information filed by U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin, 
May is accused of the manipulation of vital safety measures in order to deceive mine 
inspectors, as well as participating in a scheme to provide mining crews with advanced 
warning of government inspections.  According to the prosecutors, May was responsible 
for manipulating the mine’s ventilation system during an inspection in order to conceal 
the existence of hazardous working conditions.  Prosecutors also contend that May 
ordered the disabling of a methane monitor on a continuous mining machine at the 
UBBM less than two months before the explosion.  In addition, May is alleged to have 
ordered another worker at the UBBM to falsify mine examination records by omitting 
hazardous conditions, which were required by law to be reported.  With a conviction, the 
single felony charge would carry a sentence of up to five years in prison.  However, 
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reports indicate that May is cooperating with prosecutors, in an effort to reach a plea 
agreement, which may provide the prosecutors with the information they need to go after 
more of the 18 Massey employees, including Blankenship, who invoked their right 
against self-incrimination and have refused to cooperate with any of the investigations 
(Ward, 2012). 
In June of 2011, the acquisition of Massey Energy by rival coal giant Alpha 
Natural Resources was approved by shareholders in a deal worth over $8.5 billion.  The 
merger between Alpha and Massey has combined the third and fourth largest coal 
producers in the U.S. into the nation’s largest metallurgical coal company, with more 
than 150 mines and access to 5 billion tons of coal reserves (Ward, 2011).  The sale 
provided a massive windfall for Massey executives including former Massey Energy 
CEO Don Blankenship whose resignation was reportedly accompanied by a multi-million 
dollar “golden parachute” to go along with his shares in the company.  The fact that the 
upper management at Massey Energy, including Blankenship, continue to avoid criminal 
punishment lends credence to the idea that the killing and maiming of miners is simply 
considered the cost of doing business for these colossal coal companies, and that it is the 
job of the state and federal agencies to ensure that dangerous coal mines are allowed to 
continue their operations without disruption.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
 This chapter will provide the background necessary for understanding some of the 
underlying factors related to coal mining safety.  It begins with a brief overview of the 
history of coal mining safety in the United States, followed by a section examining the 
political economy of coal and its effect on federal regulation of the coal mining industry. 
A History of Coal Mining Safety in the United States 
One hundred years ago coal mines were like war zones.  Coal mining was unlike 
any other occupation because a miner dealt with the very real risk of death from all four 
classical elements – earth, air, fire, and water.  Many mines had unstable ceilings that 
could collapse unexpectedly at any moment, crushing miners instantly or even worse 
burying them alive under mountains of earth.  Mines had air that could poison you 
instantly (carbon monoxide), or air that could explode in your face with the slightest 
spark (methane).  In many instances miners would break through to unknown sources of 
water causing floods that would quickly trap everyone in the mine, leaving them to 
drown in the dark depths of the earth.  Every miner knew that each time they went 
underground, there was a very real chance that they may never reach the surface again 
(Freese, 2003).   
The early mines in West Virginia were no exception.  In 1907, Monongah, West 
Virginia was the site of one of the worst coal mining disasters in United States’ history.  
An essayist and activist, Edgar Allen Forbes, described the scene after a methane 
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explosion killed 361 workers: “Think of hell as a hollow hill and imagine that its power 
plant has exploded and blown a hole in the hillside.  Then imagine a handful of reckless, 
begrimed men going into the cavern with lanterns, with sulfurous fumes in their faces, 
and dragging out the charred bodies of men … that is what Monongah looked like” 
(Goodell, 2006, pp. 55-56).  However, the public outrage that followed the catastrophe at 
Monongah in 1907, which left 250 widows and more than 1,000 children fatherless, was 
not enough to force Congress into passing safety laws against the omnipotent coal 
industry.  It would take another dozen serious mine disasters throughout the country, and 
more than another 1,200 dead miners, before Congress acted, creating the United States 
Bureau of Mines as part of the Department of the Interior in 1910.   
The instructions given to the U.S. Bureau of Mines from Congress was to 
investigate mining methods and to come up with ways to improve mining conditions.  
However, the legislation created by Congress gave the U.S. Bureau of Mines absolutely 
no enforcement power.  Inspectors were not even allowed to enter a mine without the 
owner’s permission, and their findings were never to be publicized.  Another three 
decades would pass – and the lives of many thousands of miners would be lost – before 
Congress granted the bureau the authority to officially inspect mines and publicize 
findings.  These new duties, however, still left the Bureau of Mines without enforcement 
powers (Goodell, 2006).   
 In 1947, a mine explosion in Centralia, Illinois killed 111 miners.  The ensuing 
investigation revealed that for many years the mine’s owner had scornfully ignored 
warnings from dozens of sources regarding the dangerous conditions in his mine.  When 
called to testify before Congress, John L. Lewis, then the president of the United Mine 
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Workers of America, provided a memorable speech, “If we must grind up human flesh 
and bone in the industrial machine we call modern America, then before God I assert that 
those who consume coal and you and I who benefit from that service because we live in 
comfort, we owe protection to those men first, and we owe security to their families if 
they die” (Goodell, 2006, p. 61).  In 1952, near the end of his second term, President 
Harry Truman, unafraid of the all-powerful coal industry, signed the Federal Coal Mine 
Safety Act, finally giving mine inspectors the power to shut down dangerous mines.  
However, written into the law by coal industry lobbyists were numerous loopholes that 
were used by coal companies to avoid sanctions.   
 Even with the new legislation, the coal miner death toll continued to rise.  In 
1968, seventy-eight miners were killed by an explosion in a coal mine in Farmington, 
West Virginia.  This mine had a history of accidents and had previously suffered an 
explosion in 1954 that killed sixteen men.  In the two years prior to the 1968 explosion, 
the mine had been cited by inspectors for countless violations.  Lack of action to address 
these violations by the mine’s management resulted in an explosion and fire that burned 
for several days before the mine was sealed to smother the flames.  The bodies of the 
miners were never recovered.  The public’s outcry for stricter enforcement of regulations 
against unsafe coal mining companies resulted in Congress passing the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act the following year.  Not only did the new legislation 
considerably increase the enforcement powers of the Bureau of Mines, but it also gave 
miners the right to request mine inspections, and for the first time, provided benefits to 
miners disabled by black lung disease.  This was certainly a landmark moment for coal 
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mining safety in the United States; unfortunately it had come too late for the more than 
103,000 coal miners who had been killed since 1900 (Goodell, 2006).   
 The climate of tough regulations and strict enforcement against the coal mining 
industry would not last very long.  When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he helped 
stall tougher enforcement against the coal industry by placing individuals in the top 
positions at the Bureau of Mines who supported a more relaxed approach to regulation 
enforcement.  As a result, the Bureau became increasingly ineffective in its duties of 
policing the coal mining industry, leading a representative from the General Accounting 
Office to state that the Interior Department’s policies for enforcing health and safety 
standards had been “extremely lenient, confusing, and inequitable.”  This led to a 
changing of the guard in 1977, as Congress transferred the power to inspect mines and 
enforce safety laws from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor.  This 
shift in authority resulted in the creation of a new agency, the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA).  This change in jurisdiction, however, did not improve the 
enforcement of mining regulations.   
 During the Clinton Administration, the MSHA was lead by J. Davitt McAteer, a 
lawyer and mine safety expert who in the eyes of the coal mining industry was a fierce 
opponent.  Then, in 2001, President George W. Bush followed the precedent set by 
Nixon, giving the MSHA’s top position to Dave Lauriski, a former executive of Energy 
West Mining Company.  The coal companies were pleased to see Lauriski appointed 
because he was known for his belief that the coal industry should be allowed to regulate 
itself.  Lauriski had spent years lobbying the MSHA to loosen the rules against dangerous 
levels of coal dust in underground mines, and once he arrived at MSHA he immediately 
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started making changes, changing the agency’s emphasis from enforcement to education , 
training, and consulting.  Lauriski would not last long at the MSHA, resigning shortly 
after the 2004 election under a cloud of scandal.  The Department of Labor’s Inspector 
General determined that during Lauriski’s tenure, the MSHA had fraudulently awarded 
no-bid contracts totaling more than $500,000 to two companies that had ties with 
Lauriski.  Interestingly, Lauriski quickly landed a new job as a highly paid coal industry 
consultant after his resignation (Goodell, 2006). 
 In the wake of efforts to undermine the regulatory powers of the MSHA, it would 
not be long before tragedy struck again.  In January of 2006, an explosion at the Sago 
Mine in Upshur County, West Virginia, trapped 13 miners underground for nearly two 
days; only one miner made it out alive.  Questions were once again raised about the 
MSHA’s competency and its willingness to enforce mining laws after an investigation 
revealed that the Sago Mine had been cited for more than two hundred and fifty federal 
safety citations during the year prior to the explosion.  West Virginia Senator Robert 
Byrd was one the MSHA’s biggest critics.  During a fiery speech in front of the U.S. 
Senate, Byrd asked “What is that agency waiting for?  Could an automobile driver or a 
truck driver rack up 276 speeding tickets and still have a license? What if someone had 
276 mistakes on a tax return? But here was a coal company with 276 violations and it’s 
still operating” (Goodell, 2006, p. 64). 
 The tragedy of the Sago Mine disaster placed pressure on the federal government 
and, in response to the public’s protest, Congressman George Miller, head of the 
committee that oversees the MSHA, called on the Bush administration to significantly 
increase fines against mining companies that repeatedly violated federal safety 
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regulations.  In a letter to Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, Miller pointed out that the year 
before the explosion the MSHA had only fined the owner of the Sago mine $24,374, 
which equated to only $156 per violation.  This is much less than a slap on the wrist for a 
company that mined 507,775 tons of coal and sold it for nearly $70 per ton.  Miller also 
reported that many of the citations were for repeated violations of the same safety 
regulations.  For example, the mine owner was issued a $60 citation for the accumulation 
of combustible material.  However, this was the twenty-first citation for the accumulation 
of combustible material received by the owner in 2005.  Miller responded, “When a 
speeding ticket in West Virginia costs more than the twenty-first citation for 
accumulation of combustible materials, there is something horribly wrong with mine 
safety enforcement” (Goodell, 2006, pp. 64-65).     
It is hard to imagine anything like the disaster at Monongah happening today.  
Back then, there were no labor laws, no mine inspectors, no safety helmets, no safety 
training, no high-tech ventilation systems to reduce the levels of methane and coal dust, 
no heavy steel roof bolts to keep roofs from collapsing, and definitely no electronic 
meters to detect high levels of the extremely lethal gases that are often released in coal 
mines.  Actually, instead of the high-tech meters used in today’s coal mines, early coal 
miners in the United States would bring a caged canary or mouse into the mines because 
the animals’ greater sensitivity to poisonous gases could provide miners an early 
warning.  Canaries quickly became the indicator of choice because the fall from their 
perch was much more dramatic than the mouse’s reaction to carbon monoxide (Freese, 
2003, p. 49).   
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However, even one hundred years’ worth of innovations in safety and better 
equipment have not changed the fact that coal mining, especially underground coal 
mining, is still an extremely dangerous business.  Working in a coal mine today may be 
much safer than working in a coal mine a hundred years ago; however, according to the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, coal mining remains one of the 
most dangerous occupations in the United States.  Working in an underground coal mine 
is even more dangerous, the fatality rate in underground mines is five times higher than it 
is in surface coal mines.  And working in underground coal mines in West Virginia is the 
most dangerous of all.  Coal mines in West Virginia have the highest rates of fatal 
accidents and injuries in the nation, and mines in southern West Virginia are even more 
deadly.  The MSHA conducted a study in 1996 which revealed that 70 miners were killed 
in southern West Virginia in 1996, resulting in 28 percent of all U.S. mining fatalities in 
an area that employs just 13 percent of the nation’s miners.  In 2001, another report 
revealed that between 1991 and 2000, 25 percent of the country’s 458 coal mining 
fatalities – 116 deaths – occurred in southern West Virginia (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 18).   
After the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in 1969, the 
number of mining fatalities steadily declined.  In recent years, however, the numbers 
have leveled off.  Even though many coal companies remain in denial, U.S. health 
statistics show that black lung disease still kills more than 1,500 miners every year 
(Goodell, 2006, p. 53).  However, the mindset of most coal companies, and even many of 
their employees, is that coal mining has always been a dangerous business, not for the 
faint of the heart, and that the possibility of death is something that comes with the 
territory.  Every miner knows all of the dangers that are associated with coal mining 
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when he takes the job.  However, investigations have revealed that many of the coal 
mining deaths that have occurred in recent years could have, and should have been 
prevented.  
For more than a hundred years, government regulation of the coal mining industry 
in the United States has followed a systematic pattern.  History shows that the 
government makes an effort to improve safety conditions for miners, only after a disaster 
has already taken place.  During periods when there are few coal mining incidents, the 
debate over safety conditions between miners and operators is unnoticed by the general 
public and thus the government.  The occurrence of a major mining disaster, and the 
media coverage that goes along with it, heightens the publics’ perception of mine safety 
conditions, and often provides a thrust for the passage of stronger legislation.   In 1987, 
sociologist Michael Wallace, published a study examining several factors which were 
hypothesized to affect the pattern of fatality and injury rates in the American coal mining 
industry from 1930 to 1982.  He found that major mining disasters had a negative impact 
on fatality rates the following year, indicating that mines became safer following mining 
disasters.  Wallace claims that mining disasters lead to closer adherence by mine 
operators to the existing regulations and to stricter legislation (Wallace, 1987).   
Throughout United States history, many industries with safety problems have 
been successfully reformed by government agencies and their regulations.  Why is it then 
that the U.S. Government has not been more vigilant when it comes to the coal mining 
industry?  The political economy of the coal mining industry may help us find this 
answer. 
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The Political Economy of Coal 
In this section, the political economy of coal refers to the interrelation between 
economic processes and political policies that are fueled by the production of coal.  As 
mentioned earlier, the political economy of coal can help us explain why the federal 
government has tended to favor a lax regulatory approach in regards to the coal mining 
industry.  Within this political economy context, the creation and enforcement of safety 
regulations (political policy) is in conflict with the economic interests of the coal mining 
companies who support less regulation, which allows them to generate larger profits.  On 
the other hand, the miners who work for these companies encourage the creation and 
enforcement of these safety regulations which are designed to ensure their safety while 
on the job.  However, in the state of West Virginia, these coal mining communities lack 
the political strength (the absence of an effective union), and the financial strength (due 
to a flawed economy) necessary to compete against the more powerful coal corporations.    
Therefore, the argument follows that the financial and political strength of the coal 
mining industry simply outmatches that of the mining communities, and as a result, the 
interests of the coal mining industry supersede the creation and enforcement of coal 
mining regulations.  The remainder of this section will explain the role played by the coal 
mining industry in affecting federal government policies, and the economic problems 
associated with coal mining communities in West Virginia.     
The power of coal.  Most Americans have no idea how central coal is to our 
everyday lives, although the average American consumes about twenty pounds of coal 
per day.  Coal is still the major source of electric power in the United States, with more 
than half the electricity we consume coming from coal-fired power plants.  The electric 
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power generation industry (one of the largest and most capital-intensive industries in the 
country, with revenues of more than $380 billion per year) relies on more than a billion 
tons of coal per year in order to produce enough electric power to meet the country’s 
demands.   It is not surprising that an economic juggernaut as large as the coal industry 
has also had a very strong influence on the political landscape in the United States.   
The 2000 presidential election is a prime example.  Being one of the first 
American politicians to consider global warming a serious concern, Democratic 
candidate Al Gore, was immediately viewed as a major threat to the coal industry.  Every 
coal industry executive knew that Gore’s presidency would certainly be accompanied by 
strict regulations to limit dangerous emissions.  So the coal industry used its money and 
influence to support George W. Bush’s campaign. With the help of the coal industry, 
Bush was able to gain significant support in key industrial states, such as West Virginia, 
historically a Democratic stronghold, which prior to the 2000 election had not voted for a 
Republican presidential candidate in seventy-five years.  Many believe that Florida’s 
disputed recount was the deciding factor in the 2000 election, however, it could also be 
argued that West Virginia’s five electoral votes provided the edge that Bush needed to 
gain his title as Commander-in-chief. 
Bush was quick to show his gratitude to the coal industry.  Only weeks after his 
presidency began, Bush had already begun appointing former coal industry executives to 
high powered positions within the federal regulatory agencies.  Bush’s Vice President 
Dick Cheney was also eager to show his appreciation.  Cheney was in charge of the 
National Energy Policy Development Group, which was responsible for creating a new 
energy policy for the nation.  The group’s recommendations were noticeably pro-coal.  
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These recommendations included a proposal for 1,900 coal-powered plants over the next 
twenty years, and a $2 billion subsidy for research on “clean coal” technology (Goodell, 
2006).  
The significant political power controlled by the coal mining industry has also had 
an apparent impact on the policies of federal regulatory agencies.  In order to control the 
monitoring of their coal mines at the local level, coal corporations use their financial 
resources to shape policy at the federal level.  For example, Stretesky and Lynch (2011) 
stated that in 2008, the top five US coal mining companies spent $9.95 million lobbying 
federal officials in Washington to pass legislation that would be favorable to their 
industry.  This legislation included altering the requirements for mining permits which 
were considered necessary by regulatory agencies.  Instances such as these demonstrate 
that the coal industry is not timid when it comes to making noteworthy financial 
investments in order to shape the federal political process to their advantage.     
According to the report by McAteer (2011), Massey Energy was not shy about 
flaunting its political and financial power as well.  At the time of the Upper Big Branch 
Mine disaster, Massey Energy was the largest coal producer in the Appalachian region, 
and the report claims that Massey used the leverage of the jobs it provided in an attempt 
to control West Virginia’s political system.  Using this power, the company challenged 
any federal or state oversight agencies that threatened to get in their way, including the 
MSHA, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the West Virginia Office of Miners’ 
Health, Safety and Training.  The report also cites that many politicians were afraid to 
speak out against the company because they knew that Massey spent vast amounts of 
money to influence elections. 
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 Coal in West Virginia: A blessing, or a curse?  The role that the coal mining 
industry has played in the economic development of certain regions has been the subject 
of much debate and study.  In West Virginia, the negative political and economic effects 
of coal can be seen on a magnified scale.  Jeff Goodell (2006) raises a key question on 
this issue, “How is it that a rock that has been the basis for so much prosperity and 
progress in America has left behind such a trail of human and environmental wreckage in 
the regions where it is mined?” (p. 29).   The discovery of coal in West Virginia was 
celebrated as a sign of future prosperity by most West Virginians.  The states’ abundance 
of timber and coal, the two natural resources that were responsible for fueling the 
industrial revolution, were sure to make this one of the richest states in the Union.  
However, as we can see today, this was not to be the case. 
Almost 150 years later, and after the mining of more than 13 billion tons of coal, 
the state of West Virginia has not turned out the way that those early settlers had 
expected.  A state with dreams of great riches has been replaced by a state that is 
characterized by poverty, sickness, environmental devastation, and great despair.  West 
Virginia’s population is currently ranked at or near the bottom of almost every indicator 
used to determine a state’s economic condition, with some of the lowest rates of 
educational achievement, employment, and income level in the country (see various 
reports at, http://www.wvpolicy.org/releases.html).  And the situation is worse in 
southern West Virginia, where the state’s richest coal deposits can be found.  McDowell 
County, situated along West Virginia’s southern border, is home to a population that 
depends on welfare, workers’ compensation, disability, Social Security, and other 
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retirement benefits for nearly half of its total income.  For these individuals coal has 
certainly been a curse (Goodell, 2006).       
How did this happen?  Economic theory would tell us that coal mining should 
provide a financial advantage for these small coal communities in West Virginia (Banks, 
1985).  Coal mining brings jobs, creates infrastructure, and provides more opportunity for 
the growth of other industries and small businesses.  In addition, coal companies are 
required to pay state governments severance taxes for mining the land.  In 2005 alone, 
taxes from the coal mining industry in West Virginia accounted for more than $238 
million in state revenue.  Why isn’t the coal mining industry having the expected positive 
economical affect on these areas?  The economic troubles of places such as these, has 
prompted many economists to study this relationship between the extraction of natural 
resources and an area’s economic welfare.  Most of the research on this issue has looked 
at the economic troubles of third world countries that have built their economies around 
natural resource extraction, however many parallels can be drawn to the situation in West 
Virginia.    
In 2001, Harvard economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner published a study 
that revealed a significant negative relationship between natural resource-based export 
economies and gross domestic product (GDP) growth.  Of the ninety-five developing 
countries that were examined in the study, only two resource-rich countries had achieved 
at least a 2 percent annual growth rate in GDP between 1970 and 1989 (Sachs & Warner, 
2001).   
Economists offer many different explanations for why most of these resource-rich 
countries have struggling economies, however many of these theories focus on three 
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main factors.  First, the income from these resources is typically controlled by only a 
fortunate few.  Second, economies that are primarily based on the extraction of natural 
resources tend to be highly unstable.  Finally, most of these struggling third world 
countries have extremely low investments in education (Banks, 1985).        
In many of these third world countries the control over these natural resources 
allows a few individuals to gain incredible personal wealth, while also having significant 
power over the states’ economic well-being.  Their economic power also provides them 
with great influence in the political arena as well.  The tyrants and warlords of these third 
world nations take the form of corporate leaders in the United States.  Massey Energy’s 
CEO, Don Blankenship, is one of these few individuals who has benefited greatly from 
coal mining in West Virginia.  His $6 million salary in 2004 made him the highest paid 
executive in the state and also the entire coal industry.   
However, maybe more impressive than Blankenship’s wealth, is his political 
power.  Blankenship directly influenced state elections in West Virginia in 2004, by 
spending $3.5 million of his own money to fund a campaign that was aimed at defeating 
state Supreme Court justice Warren McGraw.  The campaign group, which named itself 
And for the Sake of the Kids, utilized a series of widely publicized ads which criticized 
McGraw for signing a state Supreme Court decision to parole a convicted child molester 
and allow him to work as a janitor in a public high school.  The child molester in 
question, who had pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault when he was only fifteen 
years old and had been a victim of child abuse himself, was far from the deviant sexual 
predator that had been portrayed in the media.  The inmate was never actually released to 
work in the high school, however, by simply signing the decision, along with two other 
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justices, McGraw had given the group the ammunition it needed to create a public image 
that painted McGraw as an ally for child molesters (Goodell, 2006, pp. 44-45).   
Blankenship’s real motivation for having McGraw removed from the state 
Supreme Court was based on financial reasons linked to a particular case before the 
court.  In 2002, a Boone County court convicted the Massey Energy corporation of fraud, 
and issued a $50 million judgment against the company, after it had illegally negotiated 
the buyout of a rival coal operator.  Blankenship had made it abundantly clear that he 
planned to appeal the decision all the way to the state supreme court if necessary.  At the 
time, McGraw was a current Supreme Court justice and had developed a reputation as 
being an opponent of the coal industry.  Instead of taking his chance with an anti-coal 
judge, Blankenship would hand-pick McGraw’s successor.  Blankenship’s choice to 
oppose McGraw in the upcoming election was Brent Benjamin, a Republican pro-
business lawyer who had spent the majority of his career in private practice protecting the 
interests of various corporations.  It is likely that Blankenship did not see his $3.5 million 
investment to unseat McGraw as undermining the judicial system, but instead just a smart 
business decision that was likely to reap him $50 million in reward.  A local editorial 
cartoon mocked the whole situation by depicting Benjamin arriving at the Supreme Court 
in a shipping crate labeled “Courtesy of $3.5 million from Massey Coal.”  The plot was 
so intriguing that author John Grisham borrowed it for one of his best-selling novels 
(Goodell, 2006, pp. 44-45).    
A second reason that resource-rich third world countries have struggling 
economies is that these economies tend to be based solely on natural resource extraction 
making them extremely unstable in comparison to economies that are more diversified.  
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This is in part due to the problem that the development of natural resources tends to 
crowd out the growth of other, more sustainable industries such as manufacturing.  
Unlike more balanced economies that utilize multiple industries in order to create 
revenue, natural-resource based economies are more susceptible to instability because 
these economies are so dependent on a single source of income.  When the price of these 
natural resources is high, these countries experience times of relative economic 
prosperity.  However, when these prices fall, many of these governments dive into severe 
economic decline because they do not have other forms of capital to offset the damage of 
financial losses in this sector.   
The economy of West Virginia has followed a similar historic pattern.  The 
severity of the economic issues being caused by West Virginia’s coal-based economy did 
not become apparent until after World War II.  Coal powered factories were responsible 
for producing many of the weapons and supplies used by U.S. armed forces during the 
war, however once the soldiers returned home the demand for coal began to decline.  The 
Middle East’s 1973 oil embargo caused coal prices to spike, however the effect was 
short-lived, and by 1990 more than half of the coal mines in West Virginia had been shut 
down.  The mines that did remain open were forced to expand, and become more 
efficient by replacing many of their workers with advanced machinery.  In 1980, 
McDowell County had 7,200 mining jobs, more than any other county in the state.  
However, by 2003 the mining industry employed fewer than 720 workers in McDowell 
County, a decrease of 90 percent.  According to Goodell (2006), during this 23-year span, 
the southern coal fields of West Virginia have witnessed the disappearance of more than 
26,000 mining jobs, leaving behind what Goodell refers to as “a lot of aging, sick, and 
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dependent people, many of whom gave the best years of their lives to the mines and now 
find themselves poor and forgotten” (pp. 34-35).  There was another rise in coal prices 
between 2003 and 2005, but this marginal increase has not affected the state’s overall 
economic landscape.  West Virginia had the largest decrease in economic activity for 
fiscal year 2009 at negative 13.5 percent; the next closest state was Idaho at negative 6.3 
percent.          
Most of West Virginia’s coal companies blame federal regulations and 
environmental extremists for their industry’s decline.  However, the recent descent of 
West Virginia’s coal industry is actually the result of expanded mining in Wyoming’s 
Powder River Basin.  Between 1997 and 2004, coal production had declined by 18 
percent in West Virginia, whereas Wyoming’s level of coal production had grown by 
more than 40 percent during the same time span.  There are several reasons why 
Wyoming has taken over the lead in domestic coal production.  First, it is much easier to 
mine coal out of the massive eighty-foot seams found in the Powder Rivers Basin’s 
flatlands, than out of the six-foot seams buried in West Virginia’s rugged and 
mountainous landscape.  The difference in productivity rates between the two states is 
astounding.   In West Virginia, four tons of coal are mined per employee hour, whereas in 
Wyoming, thirty-nine tons of coal are mined per employee hour – nearly ten times the 
amount.  Productivity rates such as these allow mining companies in Wyoming to offer 
much more competitive prices for their coal.  This puts West Virginian coal companies, 
such as Massey Energy, under extreme pressure to cut costs and find new ways to 
increase productivity (Goodell, 2006).   
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Another factor that explains Wyoming’s dominance is linked to our country’s air 
pollution laws that are geared towards reducing the amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
released into the atmosphere by coal-burning power plants.  SO2 is responsible for acid 
forming pollution which causes acid rain showers in Los Angeles and the heavy haze that 
often covers New York City. Many of the pollutants that have been linked to SO2 have 
also caused immeasurable damage to our country’s ecosystems.  Luckily for Wyoming, it 
just so happens that coal deposits in the western United States have significantly reduced 
levels of sulfur in them.  Therefore, it is much easier and cheaper for a coal power plant 
to buy its coal from Wyoming than to implement the expensive new technology 
necessary to reduce SO2 emissions (Freese, 2003).  These factors make Wyoming’s coal 
the obvious choice for many power plants across the country.   
 Finally, economists have found that the numerous third world countries that have 
struggling extraction economies also make very small investments in education for their 
population.    Once again, this situation is similar to the coal mining communities of West 
Virginia.  As mentioned earlier, these areas have some of the lowest rates of educational 
achievement throughout the entire country.  In fact, these coal mining communities have 
literacy rates that are comparable to many third world countries.  The inadequate 
investment in education is further illustrated by the lack of secondary education available 
to the residents in these coal mining communities.  The presence of state universities and 
colleges, community colleges, and even vocational schools is almost non-existent in these 
counties.  This is likely due, in part, to the interests of coal mining corporations, which 
put a higher emphasis on workers with more brawn than brain.  These institutions are 
seen as opposition by coal mining companies because they threaten to steal their current 
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and future workforce.  With the continued occurrence of incidents like the Upper Big 
Branch Mine disaster, coal mining is becoming less and less of a glamorous career, and 
academic institutions such as these provide current and prospective coal miners with an 
alternative to working in the mines (Goodell, 2006).   
When compared to the massive political and financial forces controlled by the 
coal mining industry, the poor state of economic conditions in these coal mining 
communities allows us to understand why these groups are ineffective in convincing the 
government to enforce higher standards of workplace safety.  These communities simply 
do not have the resources available to influence political policy in the same manner as the 
coal companies they work for.  This explains why significant changes to coal mining 
regulations usually occur only after a major disaster has already taken place.  
Unfortunately, these catastrophes are required in order for these marginalized 
communities to gain the national recognition and support necessary to enforce stricter 
regulations against the more powerful coal mining industry.  In the words of author Jeff 
Goodell (2006), “If the sorry history of the coal mining industry has proven one thing, 
it’s that when it comes to enacting and enforcing safety laws against Big Coal [the coal 
industry], the only good lobbyists are dead miners” (p. 60).   
Although the political economy of coal may explain why the U.S. government is 
not a strong regulator of the coal mining industry, and why regulation agencies are scared 
to enforce mining safety laws against a powerful company like Massey Energy, this is 
only a partial explanation for the catastrophe on April 5th, 2010.  To fully understand why 
disasters like the one at the Upper Big Branch Mine occur, we will look to theoretical 
explanations from the corporate crime literature.   
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Chapter Four:  Theoretical Explanations of Corporate Crime 
 
Scholarly Foundations 
 One of the earliest statements recognizing the deviant actions of powerful people 
and the organizations they control was made in 1907, by sociologist Edward Alsworth 
Ross.  Ross referred to this type of individual as “The Criminaloid.”  Ross characterized 
the criminaloid as someone who is not driven by evil impulse, but is instead affected by 
moral insensibility.  According to Ross (1907), “they want nothing more than we all want 
– money, power, consideration – in a word, success; but they are in a hurry and they are 
not particular as to the means” (p. 45).  From the very beginning, Ross realized that 
attaining success was the main motivation for these individuals to commit crime.  Ross 
found that the criminaloid preferred to prey on the unassuming members of the public 
that were less likely to recognize the nature of these crimes.  Ross argued that the 
criminaloid was not antisocial by nature, but instead was unevenly moral, being a very 
strong adherent to family virtues, but lacking in the realm of commercial and civic ethics.  
He decided that in order to disguise themselves, criminaloids often participated in a 
protective mimicry of the good.  Criminaloids would present themselves as good citizens 
by participating in various social activities amongst the community including going to 
church, local fairs, holiday celebrations, and town hall meetings.  Unlike the street 
criminals hiding amongst the shadows, the criminaloids were no strangers to the 
community, always in the open and with what appeared to be clean hands.  However, 
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Ross explained how the criminaloid operated within the gray areas of law, exploiting 
various business opportunities using methods that had yet to be outlawed or had been 
created to work around current laws.  Nevertheless, Ross understood the threat posed by 
the criminaloid, whom he claimed was  
Society’s most dangerous foe, more redoubtable by far than the 
plain criminal, because he sports the livery of virtue and operates 
on a Titanic scale.  Every year that sees him pursue in insolent 
triumph his nefarious career raises up a host of imitators and 
hurries society toward moral bankruptcy (Ross, 1907, p. 48). 
 
The work of Ross influenced another sociologist who would later become the first to use 
the term “white collar” crime to define the crimes of the powerful.   
 In 1939, Edwin Sutherland delivered a landmark presidential address to the 
American Sociological Society on what he referred to as “white collar” criminality.  In 
his speech Sutherland rejected the idea that crime was only a problem of the lower class, 
and opened the eyes of academics to the criminal behavior of the upper classes.  
Sutherland (1949) defined white collar crime as, “a crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” (p. 2).  In a 
renowned study, Sutherland revealed the crimes of 70 of the nation’s largest corporations.  
Sutherland’s findings revealed that 60 percent of the 70 corporations had been convicted 
in criminal courts and had an average of approximately four convictions each.  According 
to Sutherland, the amount of crimes committed by these repeat offenders was sufficient to 
refute the false notion of conventional theories at the time that suggested that crime was 
due to the personal and social pathologies connected with poverty (Sutherland, 1949).     
 In order to explain the crimes committed by these large corporations, Sutherland 
formulated a general sociological theory of crime and delinquency, which he referred to 
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as Differential Association Theory.  Sutherland proposed that his theory was not only an 
explanation for individual criminal behavior, but was also suited for explaining the 
differences in group or societal crime rates.  The theory assumes that criminal behavior is 
learned from associations with other persons through a process of symbolic interaction, 
which usually takes place in intimate groups.  Symbolic interactionism presumes that 
social interaction is mainly the exchange of meaning and symbols; according to Ritzer 
(1992), individuals have the cognitive capacity to imagine themselves in the roles of 
others and incorporate this into their conception of themselves.  Through these 
associations an individual is able to learn the values, attitudes, techniques, and motives 
for criminal behavior.  According to Sutherland, a person commits criminal acts because 
he or she has learned definitions favorable to violation of law in excess of definitions 
unfavorable to violation of law.  In addition, this balance of rationalizations is influenced 
by the priority, frequency, duration, and the intensity of associations that support law-
violating definitions versus law-abiding definitions (Sutherland, 1949).  The ground 
breaking work done by Sutherland provided the foundation for future criminological 
study of the crimes of the powerful.             
Current Criminological Theories 
As mentioned in chapter one, our society is primarily focused on street crime and 
as a result most criminological theories are aimed at explaining these types of crime.  
However, several theories from current criminological literature that are typically used to 
explain street crime have also been applied to the crimes of the powerful.  Among these 
are self-control theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), social learning theory (Akers, 
1973), general strain theory (Agnew, 2006), and institutional anomie theory (Messner & 
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Rosenfeld, 2007).  Another theory, referred to as contextual anomie/strain theory 
(Robinson & Murphy, 2009), was created with a more specific intent of explaining 
corporate crime.  Each of these theories and their significance for understanding the 
crimes of the powerful are summarized below. 
Self-Control Theory.  Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) are well known for their 
attempt to explain criminal behavior using the construct of self-control.  Self-control 
theory assumes that an individual’s lack of self-control is responsible for their increased 
inclination to commit crime.  According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, self-control is 
learned through the process of socialization, and as a result the primary causal factor 
associated with low self-control is ineffective child-rearing.  The authors also claim that 
an individual’s level of self-control is stable across their lifespan.  Therefore, children 
and adolescents with low self-control will also have low self-control as adults.  
Gottfredson and Hirschi characterize individuals with low self-control as being 
impulsive, insensitive, short-sighted, risk-taking, and egocentric, which makes them more 
likely to engage in deviant and criminal behavior on a frequent basis. 
Self-control theory is considered a general theory of crime, meaning that it is 
intended to explain all types of crime, including deviant behavior that is not considered 
crime.  However, while self-control theory does provide some insight into street level 
offenses, it offers very little explanatory power for the crimes committed by the powerful 
(Benson & Moore, 1992; Reed & Yeager, 1996; Simpson & Piquero, 2002).  For 
example, the authors identified several elements of crime committed by individuals with 
low self-control; these elements included crimes that were immediate, easy, offered 
simple gratification with few long term benefits, and required little skill or planning 
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(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p.89).  These elements do not translate well to most of the 
crimes committed by the powerful, which oftentimes are extremely complex, take place 
over long periods of time, require large amounts of planning and premeditation, and are 
committed by individuals with advanced skill sets.  It seems very unlikely that the 
individuals described by Gottfredson and Hirschi as having low self-control would even 
be able to secure regular employment, let alone achieve the highest positions within a 
corporation.  However, Gottfredson and Hirschi continue to argue that amongst corporate 
officials there should be significant differences in self-control between those who offend 
and those who do not, even though empirical research offers little support for these 
claims.  A study by Simpson and Piquero (2002) found that corporate offending 
propensity and behavioral indicators of low self-control were unrelated. 
Social Learning Theory.  Another general theory of crime, Akers’ (1977) social 
learning theory, is an expanded version of Sutherland’s differential association theory.  
Akers’ social learning theory is based on four central concepts: differential association, 
definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation.  Akers retained the concepts of 
differential association and definitions from Sutherland’s theory.  Social learning theory, 
however, provides another dimension to explain how these definitions are learned.  
Whereas Sutherland argued that the learning of ideas about the law are only produced 
through differential association, social learning theory argues that criminal behaviors can 
also be directly learned by individuals through the process of operant conditioning.  
Operant conditioning specifies that learning can take place through responses to an 
individual’s behavior. 
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Based on this idea, Akers incorporated the concept of differential reinforcement 
into his social learning theory.  Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual 
or anticipated rewards and punishments that are the consequences of a certain behavior.  
According to this principle, whether or not individuals will refrain from or commit a 
crime depends on the actual or anticipated future rewards weighed against the possible 
punishments for their actions.  The probability that an act will occur is increased by 
rewarding outcomes and reactions (positive reinforcement) and is enhanced when the 
action allows the individual to avoid aversive consequences (negative reinforcement).  
Similar to differential association, differential reinforcement is influenced by conditions 
which include quantity, frequency, and probability (Akers, 1977).   
The fourth major concept of social learning theory is imitation.  Akers describes 
imitation as the engagement in behavior after the observation of similar behavior by 
others (Akers, 1977).  The likelihood of imitation occurring is affected by the 
characteristics of the models, the behavior being observed, and the observed 
consequences of the behavior (Bandura, 1977).   
Although social learning theory is a general theory of crime that is supposed to 
explain all forms of crime and deviance, the empirical research on white collar and 
corporate crime using this theory, have produced mixed results.  A study conducted by 
Piquero, Tibbetts, and Blankenship (no relation to Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenhip) 
in 2005, revealed that the decision to commit corporate crime was inversely related to the 
perceptions of peers, failing to support the principle of differential association.  However, 
other studies of white collar crime have found partial support for social learning theory 
(Higgins, Fell & Wilson, 2006).  Based on these results, it is safe to assume that further 
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research is required in order to determine the exact role of social learning theory in 
explaining the crimes of the powerful.      
General Strain Theory.  According to Agnew’s (2006) general strain theory, the 
occurrence of crime is the result of individual reactions to strain.  Agnew defines strains 
as circumstances that cause distress, and separates them into two categories.  Objective 
strains are those that cause a general suffering amongst the masses, whereas subjective 
strains are distresses experienced by particular individuals.  Agnew specifies the three 
major causes of strain that include (1) the loss of something valuable, (2) negative 
treatment from others, and (3) failure to achieve goals.  Crime is therefore viewed as a 
means to reduce or escape from the anxieties of strain, achieve revenge against those 
perceived to be causing the strain, or to alleviate the pressures of negative emotion.  
Individuals who lack the ability to cope with strain using legal methods, and who 
perceive the costs of criminality as being low, are more likely to cope with strain by 
committing crime.  There are many factors which influence the individual’s reaction to 
strain, including personality traits, goals, values, and previous experiences.  However, the 
chronic or repeated exposure to strains can create a general disposition for criminal 
behavior (Agnew, 2006).  
According to Agnew not everyone experiencing strain will respond with criminal 
behavior.  Individuals who do engage in crime, however, do so as a means to cope with 
strain.  Some individuals are more likely to respond to strain with crime than others.  
Agnew explains that a person’s reaction to strain depends on the characteristics of the 
strain one experiences, his/her own traits, and the environment in which he/she finds 
themselves.  Individuals who have poor coping skills, inadequate social support, have 
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low levels of self control, have favorable attitudes towards crime, associate with others 
who commit crime, or are in situations in which the benefits of crime outweigh the costs 
of crime are more likely to commit crime in order to cope with strain (Agnew, 2006).     
General strain theory has typically been used in prior research to explain street 
level crimes, however, the theory can be applied to white collar crimes as well.  Strains in 
the corporate world are often characterized by financial, goal-related, and economic 
inequalities.  These strains coupled with the competitive nature of the corporate 
environment can be extended as explanations of white collar and corporate crime.  This 
behavior is seen by the individual as alleviating the strains associated with individual and 
corporate finances, an individual’s future position within an organization, and corporate 
progress in the global market (Agnew, 2006).  Langton and Piquero (2007) found that 
individuals who reported strain were more likely to be financially motivated to commit 
white collar crimes.    
Institutional Anomie Theory.  A modern version of strain theory, Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s (2007) institutional anomie theory, uses the interaction of culture and social 
structure to explain crime.  According to Messner and Rosenfeld, certain cultural 
circumstances interact with existing social structures in a way that encourages crime 
amongst certain groups of people.  The social structure component of institutional anomie 
theory (IAT) is the imbalance of power between economic and noneconomic institutions, 
which in turn leads to weak institutional control and inadequate support for noneconomic 
institutions, such as the family and educational system.  The cultural element of IAT is 
centered around the notion of the “American dream,” which causes pressure for 
individuals to achieve economic success resulting in anomie.  The term anomie, coined 
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by sociologist Émile Durkheim, refers to “a weakening of normative order in society” 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 11).  Messner and Rosenfeld claim that the American 
dream socializes the masses to seek economic success and believe that, with a little hard 
work, their chances of achieving this success are all but guaranteed.  This mindset 
facilitates the pursuit of unattainable aspirations and material wealth.  Not only does this 
focus on material success undermine the importance of noneconomic structures, but it 
also clashes with the reality of the existing social structure of economic inequality 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).   
According to Messner and Rosenfeld, the four value foundations of the American 
dream are achievement, individualism, universalism, and materialism.  An individual’s 
self-worth is often evaluated on the basis of achievement.  The concept of individualism 
is tied to the ideas of individual identity and individuals rights that permeate American 
society.  Universalism is described by the authors as the universal acceptance of cultural 
goals and values, and materialism is expressed as a focus on monetary success and 
material accumulation.  Many Americans find themselves unable to achieve these values 
associated with the American dream using the legitimate means that are available to 
them.  According to anomie theorists, criminality occurs as a function of added priority 
being placed on the goals associated with the American dream (e.g., wealth) over the 
legitimate means to achieve those goals (e.g., work).  As a result, Messner and Rosenfeld 
(2007) claim that the pressure to achieve this success “by any means necessary” (p. 21) 
causes certain individuals to abandon legitimate means such as work in favor of more 
innovative means such as crime.   
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Messner and Rosenfeld maintain that this unachievable pursuit of financial 
success, along with the actuality of economic disparity, contributes to the commission of 
street crime as well as crimes of the powerful.  In the context of a corporation, some 
executives are motivated to increase profits at any cost necessary in order to achieve the 
values associated with the American dream.  The desire for success and the consequences 
of failure only become more magnified as individuals advance within their organizations.  
Messner and Rosenfeld would argue that the cultural prioritization of financial success 
creates the pressure to maximize individual income and corporate profit, and when 
legitimate means do not allow corporate executives to reach their goals, they are more 
likely to turn to criminal pathways.    
Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory.   Robinson and Murphy’s (2009) contextual 
anomie/strain theory builds upon institutional anomie theory by adding the concept of 
maximization in order to analyze corporate crime.  Similar to Messner and Rosenfeld, 
Robinson and Murphy argue that the American dream promotes criminality through 
greed, strain, and anomie.  However, contextual anomie/strain theory offers a new 
mechanism, referred to as maximization, to explain this criminality.  Maximization is 
defined by Robinson and Murphy (2009) as “the concomitant utilization of legitimate 
(i.e., legal) and illegitimate (i.e., illegal) means to achieve the goals associated with the 
American dream” (p. 3).  Therefore, this form of behavior involves certain situations in 
which individuals are able to obey and violate the law at the same time.   
Maximization is the combination of two adaptive modes of strain: conformity and 
innovation.  The concept of conformity is described as the acceptance of cultural goals 
and institutional means, which are consistent with law-abiding behavior.  Innovation is 
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defined as the acceptance of cultural goals and the rejection of institutional means, 
resulting in criminal behavior.  Therefore, those who utilize strategies of maximization 
employ legitimate means, as well as illegitimate means in pursuit of their goals.  
According to Robinson and Murphy, “maximizers” simultaneously engage in both 
conformity and innovation, such that the boundaries between law-abiding behaviors and 
criminal behaviors become distorted or are simply disregarded.  The authors explain that 
this type of behavior is especially likely to occur in corporate settings where the added 
pressure to achieve financial success oftentimes allows illegitimate means to become 
routine.  Robinson and Murphy (2009) argue that crime and deviance have become 
normalized activities amongst corporations because maximization is the primary method 
for corporations to get ahead of their competition.          
Robinson and Murphy have applied their theory to several different forms of 
corporate crime, however, it is yet to be tested by empirical research.  This is due to the 
difficulties involved with measuring strain as well as theoretical concepts such as 
maximization.  The early studies of classic strain measured strain in terms of a 
goals/means disjuncture, whereas most recent research has considered other measures of 
strain; including the perception of block opportunities, dissatisfaction with monetary 
status, and relative deprivation.  Having to measure these concepts for a corporation, 
instead of an individual, makes the process even more difficult.   In addition, measuring 
theoretical concepts such as maximization, which combine multiple principles, can be 
very problematic.  Contextual anomie/strain theory faces several other limitations.  The 
authors suggest that corporations commit crime by utilizing conformity and innovation 
simultaneously, however, they do not explain why corporations choose these modes of 
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adaptation in response to strain as opposed to others.  Also, it could be argued that in 
certain situations conformity and innovation may not be occurring together, but instead 
corporate actors are simply drifting in and out of crime, similar to the juvenile offenders 
portrayed in David Matza’s theory of “delinquency and drift.”  In addition, Contextual 
anomie/strain theory may be limited because it focuses solely on economic strain.  
Although, economic strain is likely to be the primary motivating factor for most corporate 
crime, it is entirely possible that there could be other types of strain that cause corporate 
actors to commit crime. 
In the first chapter of Robinson and Murphy’s (2009) book Greed is Good: 
Maximization and Elite Deviance in America, the first example the authors give for 
maximization is “a board of directors of a corporation (which by definition is involved in 
legal activity) deciding to ignore workplace safety regulations (an illegal activity) in 
order to ‘maximize’ profits” (p. 3).   In the following chapter I will argue that 
maximization is the primary reason why the executives of Massey Energy decided to 
overlook workplace safety regulations in order to increase their profits, which directly led 
to the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, and the deaths of twenty-nine men.    
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Chapter Five:  Application of Theory 
 
 Robinson and Murphy’s (2009) Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory is centered on 
the concept of maximization.  The following chapter will apply this concept to the crimes 
committed by Massey Energy prior to the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster.  The main 
premise of this theory is that the American dream promotes criminality through greed, 
strain, and anomie.   
According to Robinson and Murphy, the cultural goals associated with the 
American dream have permeated our society, and the notion of monetary success is of the 
highest importance amongst American citizens.  Even President Barack Obama made a 
reference to this phenomenon in a statement regarding the UBBM disaster, “How can we 
let anyone in this country put their lives at risk by simply showing up to work; by simply 
pursuing the American dream?” (White House Press Release, 2010).  Statements such as 
this one, provide support for Robinson and Murphy’s claim that the American Dream has 
become a universally accepted idea amongst United States citizens.  Although everyone 
is subject to the pressures of attaining the American dream, Robinson and Murphy claim 
this pressure is most pronounced within the context of the American corporation.  That is, 
in American corporations, there are added pressures to engage in innovations while in 
pursuit of the American dream, so much so that criminality in the context of the work 
environment is oftentimes expected, and at times even celebrated (Robinson & Murphy, 
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2009, p. 33).  For Massey Energy, this was exactly the case at the Upper Big Branch 
Mine where maximization emerged as the acceptable way of doing business. 
 My argument is that the practice of maximization manifested itself at the UBBM 
because executives of Massey Energy were under extreme pressure to outperform their 
competition in the coal mining industry.  As mentioned earlier, the cheap coal coming out 
of the state of Wyoming was making it very difficult for mine owners in the east to match 
these prices and still come away with a profit.  Because legitimate means of production 
were not providing significant enough revenues, illegitimate methods were adopted as the 
solution for a decreasing profit margin.   The mining of coal is a legal activity protected 
and encouraged by the criminal law.  However, if a company intentionally ignores 
workplace safety regulations (innovation) in the pursuit of mining coal (conformity) this 
activity becomes illegal – this is maximization.  The following two sections will provide 
evidence that demonstrates how maximization became part of Massey Energy’s corporate 
subculture, and how the criminal actions of this subculture became normalized at the 
UBBM. 
A Culture of Maximization  
 Influenced by the elements of maximization, Massey Energy developed a 
corporate mentality that placed the drive to produce coal above worker safety.  According 
to interviews conducted by McAteer’s investigators, the majority of miners indicated that 
the pressure to produce coal far outweighed the importance of maintaining a safe work 
environment.  In order to satisfy the greed of Massey’s executives, the concept of 
maximization became infused within the corporate subculture.  Illegitimate means of 
influencing workers (innovations) were used prominently in conjunction with everyday 
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working procedures (conformity).  Production reports, intimidation of workers, public 
display of injury reports, institutional secrecy, violations being viewed as part of the 
business process, “nasty notes”, and enhanced employment agreements are some of the 
ways in which a culture of maximization manifested itself at the Upper Big Branch Mine. 
 Production reports.  At the UBBM, the amount of coal being produced from the 
longwall was officially reported every thirty minutes, and was then relayed up the chain 
of command all the way to Massey Energy headquarters.  When work was stopped at the 
longwall, section bosses were responsible for completing downtime reports to explain 
why coal was not being produced.  However, during instances in which production was 
halted due to dangerous conditions, the section bosses were instructed to write only 
“downtime” in explanation of the work stoppage, making sure not to create a record 
acknowledging a potentially deadly situation.  Procedures such as these sent a very clear 
message to all of the workers as to what management considered to be most important 
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 99). 
 Intimidation of workers.  Ample evidence provided through the miners’ 
testimony revealed that the miners were discouraged from stopping production for safety 
reasons.  The workers stated that those who questioned safety conditions were threatened 
by management in order to continue production.  Miners at the UBBM learned to keep 
their mouths shut.  Taking a stand against management essentially meant putting your 
career on the line.  Without a powerful union for protection, and in an area where 
hundreds of unemployed men are waiting in line for jobs, a miner who complains about 
dangerous conditions is likely to find himself out of work.  Miners at the UBBM saw 
firsthand what happened to individuals who stood up against the corporation. 
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 Mine foreman, Brian Collins, stopped his crew from running coal when he 
reported inadequate ventilation during his pre-shift exam.  Collins would not allow any 
work to be started on his section until the ventilation issues were resolved, which 
reportedly took about an hour.  When Collins arrived at work the next day, he was 
informed that management had decided to suspend him for three days due to “poor work 
performance.”  Instances such as these made it very apparent that anyone who decided to 
stand in the way of production would have to suffer the consequences (McAteer et al., 
2011, p. 100).      
 Injury reports.  At the UBBM, a safety board outside the bathhouse was used to 
list all self reported injuries.  However, many of the miners did not report their injuries 
because all injuries posted to this board would include the injured worker’s name.  This 
type of public display created peer pressure amongst the miners, and the threat of 
retaliation from management caused many injuries to go unreported (McAteer et al., 
2011, p. 99). 
 Institutional secrecy.  Testimony from the miners indicated that workers at the 
UBBM were unaware of the seriousness of conditions in the mine, and that the results of 
inspections were kept from the miners.  Only a privileged few were made aware of the 
dangerous conditions throughout the mine.  Even foremen and section bosses were kept 
informed on a “need to know” basis, and were unaware of ventilation changes, and other 
hazardous conditions (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 99). 
 Violations seen as a part of doing business.  Massey Energy officials have made 
numerous public statements expressing their opinion that violations are simply one of the 
costs of doing business.  Any rumors regarding the dangers of Massey mines were 
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quickly dispelled by the company’s public relations campaign.  On several occasions, 
Massey officials were responsible for making statements claiming that their mines 
exceeded industry standards for workplace safety.  Although statistics have shown that 
this perception is completely unfounded, it was widely believed amongst the 
corporation’s employees, especially those who had never worked for other mining 
companies.  Many new miners were under the false assumption that they were going to 
work for a company that put the safety of their miners above all else.  Unfortunately this 
was not to be the case.    
The significance of violations was further diminished by the company’s legal 
department, which was responsible for contesting these violations.  Information obtained 
from the MSHA’s online data retrieval system provides evidence that Massey Energy 
was engaged in a consistent practice of contesting violations and backlogging the 
regulatory process.  From 2008 to 2010, the MSHA has proposed $2,274,691 in penalties 
for violations at the UBBM.  However, to date, the company has paid only $600,771 or 
26.4 percent, of those proposed penalties.  By fighting these violations, Massey has been 
able to avoid paying nearly three-fourths of their fines while continuing to accelerate 
their profits during this time period.  Management’s trivialization of violations, created a 
group mentality amongst the workforce, in which violations were seen as part of doing 
business, and nothing the miners should be concerned about (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 
93-95).        
“Nasty notes”.  UBBM foreman, Glenn Ullman, told investigators that if a crew 
had not completed a job during their previous shift it was not uncommon for them to find 
what he referred to as “nasty notes” waiting for them before they started their next shift.  
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Ullman described these as, “some sarcastic note for all my men to see … making you feel 
belittled.”  Management at the UBBM used these “nasty notes” as a way to motivate the 
foremen to push their crews harder and produce more coal (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 100).  
Enhanced employment agreements.  The company also used enhanced 
employee agreements in order to discourage workers from complaining about safety 
concerns or hazardous working conditions.  Under the terms of these agreements, the 
company offered pay increases, bonuses and guaranteed employment in exchange for an 
employees’ agreement to stay on the job for at least three years.  However, by accepting 
the company’s terms, the miners made themselves even more vulnerable to the will of the 
corporation.  If the miners left the company voluntarily or were terminated “for lack of 
performance, or unacceptable conduct,” the miners were forced to return their “enhanced 
pay” and all of the bonuses received under the contract.  In addition, they were not 
permitted to work at any competitor’s coal mine within a 90-mile radius of the mine 
where they had previously been employed.  By providing the miners with these enhanced 
employment agreements, the corporation was protecting itself by giving miners more to 
lose if they decided to get in the way of corporate interests (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 100).     
The Effects of Maximization 
Within the corporation, the principles of maximization are passed downwards 
from the highest levels of management.   These principles are learned as employees are 
socialized by their superiors and individuals begin to associate maximization as the 
proven method for climbing the corporate ladder.  According to Robinson and Murphy 
(2009), managers are responsible for making decisions and giving orders that are in the 
best interest of the corporation, even when these decisions are not in line with their own 
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personal standards and values.  Over time, a corporate subculture emerges and the 
deviant acts that are committed as part of this subculture are “filtered through a 
sanitizing, ideological prism, which gives them the appearance of not being criminal or 
deviant” (Robinson & Murphy, 2009, p. 49).  Therefore, this process of maximization 
allows for many criminal actions to become normalized in the workplace.       
At the time of the explosion, the organizational culture at Massey Energy was 
engaged in the process of maximization, and in the push to produce coal, made 
allowances for the faulty ventilation system, inadequate rock-dusting and poorly 
maintained equipment.  According to McAteer’s report Massey intentionally neglected 
safety precautions in order to increase profit margins, threatening miners with termination 
if they stopped work in areas that lacked adequate oxygen levels.  These and other unsafe 
practices including illegal ventilation changes, poor engineering designs, water problems, 
an ineffective fireboss system, disabled safety mechanisms, and fraudulent fireboss 
practices suggests that deviant practices had become normalized at the Upper Big Branch 
Mine in an effort to maximize the production of coal. 
 Making it hard to breath.  Extremely low airflow was a constant problem in the 
UBBM.  It became routine for miners and section bosses to keep airlock doors open in 
order to provide airflow to their working areas.  There are multiple sources of evidence 
documenting that, in the months leading up to the explosion, the airflow had been 
reversed on a number occasions, which would indicate a serious problem with the mine’s 
engineering and ventilation plan.  In addition, evidence was uncovered of major 
ventilation changes being made while miners were working underground, which is once 
again a violation of law and demonstrates a blatant disregard for worker safety.  Although 
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both state and federal inspectors wrote citations for ventilation violations, no action was 
ever taken to correct the problems causing these airflow issues, and as a result dealing 
with dangerously low airflow became part of the standard operating procedure at the 
UBBM (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 59-66).   
 Inadequate rock dusting.  The vitally important practice of rock dusting was not 
a priority at the UBBM.  The company’s lack of commitment to one of the most basic 
and important safety procedures is evidenced by the fact that only a two-man crew, 
working on a part-time basis, was assigned to dust the entire mine, not to mention the fact 
that the rock dusting equipment assigned to them did not work properly.  Rock dusting 
was seen by the management as unimportant and time consuming process that got in the 
way of their main goal of producing coal.  As a result, the exclusion of this basic mining 
safety practice became normalized, and the miners were forced to work in hazardous 
areas that had not been properly rock dusted (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 50-55).    
 Faulty equipment and structure.  The use of faulty equipment was the norm at 
the UBBM.  A poorly maintained shearer, broken rock dusters, defective airlock doors, 
inadequate water lines, and disabled safety mechanisms are all direct signs of a 
company’s inattention to equipment and structure.  However, to make matters worse, 
investigators revealed that the UBBM had an unstable engineering design.  Rather than 
having an overall engineering plan to guide the mining, testimony from engineers 
assigned to the UBBM, suggested that the mine was engineered as operations advanced.  
The engineers stated that they were frequently not involved, and had not approved many 
of the ventilation changes that were made by the mine’s upper management (McAteer et 
al., 2011, p. 98). 
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Water problems.  The UBBM had continuous problems with high water 
throughout working sections of the mine.  In addition to compromising the ventilation 
system, the high water posed serious safety risks for the miners who could not see the 
surface of the floor beneath the water.  Nonetheless, sending miners into chest-deep water 
was not seen as a hazard at the UBBM, just another routine aspect of an already 
dangerous job (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 98).   
 Ineffective fireboss system.  A fireboss is a mine employee who is responsible 
for examining a mine for potential dangers, particularly explosive gases.  The fireboss is 
usually the first person to enter a mine, verifying the mine’s safety before working crews 
are allowed to enter the mine.  The duties of the fireboss are usually completed by a 
foreman or shift manager in mines that don’t assign employees to this specific role.  
Therefore, these individuals are not only responsible for keeping their miners safe, but 
are also expected to ensure that their miners are efficient in producing coal. 
Unfortunately, these two roles can sometimes come into conflict with each other, because 
putting safety first will oftentimes slow the production of coal.  This was the case at the 
UBBM where management had put an emphasis on producing coal over maintaining 
safety, and as a result the fireboss examination system, aimed at identifying problems and 
protecting the lives of miners, proved to be absolutely ineffective. 
 For example, although fireboss records mentioned inadequate ventilation 
throughout the mine, these records failed to reveal when and where the lack of airflow 
was occurring.  In addition, fireboss requests for additional rock dusting were frequently 
ignored.  In fact, records show that in the ten days leading up to the disaster, only eleven 
percent of the rock dustings requested were completed.  Management’s ignorance of 
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these issues became the norm because the recognition of unsafe working conditions 
might have meant dedicating precious man hours to correcting these problems (McAteer 
et al., 2011, pp. 98-99). 
  Fraudulent fireboss practices.  In the weeks preceding the disaster at the 
UBBM, investigators discovered that one of the foreman’s hand-held methane detectors 
had not been turned on, even though he had filled out examiner records as if he had taken 
readings using the detector.  The foreman in question was responsible for assessing gas 
levels in the critical entries adjacent to the longwall, where the initial explosion occurred.  
Additional data downloaded from the methane detectors after the explosion indicated that 
many of the devices used by other foremen had not been turned on when these foremen 
were underground with their crews, and were responsible for indentifying hazardous 
conditions.  Not only is the failure to take these required readings a violation of state and 
federal law, these actions demonstrate the attitude of a company fixated on production 
over safety (McAteer et al., 2011, pp. 98-99).  
 All the investigators agreed that in order for an explosion of this magnitude to 
occur, many of the systems that have been created to safeguard the lives of miners had to 
have failed.  The ventilation system had to be faulty; there had to have been a huge 
buildup of coal dust throughout the mine in order to carry the explosion so far; there had 
to be inadequate rock dusting to allow the coal dust to become so explosive; there had to 
be a failure to maintain equipment and structure; and there had to be a breakdown in the 
fireboss system through which unsafe conditions are supposed to be identified and 
corrected.  Any one of these breakdowns can take place in any mine, however, in order 
for all of these failures to take place in the same mine, at the same time, requires a 
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subculture of maximization in which deviant practices have been allowed to become 
normalized.   
 Robinson and Murphy’s contextual anomie/strain theory provides us with a 
theoretical framework to explain why and how the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster 
occurred.  Such total and catastrophic system failures can only be explained within the 
context of maximization.  For this corporation, the primary means of coping with the 
financial strains caused by competition was maximization – using illegitimate means in 
conjunction with legitimate means.  In pursuit of the American dream, Massey executives 
intentionally ignored workplace safety regulations with the hopes of increasing 
production levels and in turn their profit margin.  In addition, by fostering a corporate 
subculture that emphasized production, influencing workers using illegitimate methods, 
and degrading the importance of safety, Massey Energy executives allowed deviant 
practices to become normalized at the UBBM.  All of this culminated in a perfect storm 
that caused the worst coal mining disaster in forty years, and claimed the lives of twenty-
nine men.   
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Chapter Six: Discussion 
 
In many instances the death of a miner is the result of a legitimate accident.  
However, in some cases there are circumstances surrounding these deaths that can elevate 
the incident from an accident to a crime.  Officials at Massey argue that the deaths of 
these twenty-nine men were the result of an unforeseeable accident; however, based on 
the evidence provided in this paper, I would argue that these men were killed in a 
preventable accident.  In a situation such as this, criminal liability is transformed: 
whereas no one can be blamed for an unforeseen accident, specific persons, even in their 
capacities as representatives of disembodied corporations, can and should be held legally 
responsible for the consequences of a preventable event.  The rest of this chapter will 
provide a discussion on the criminal liability of corporations such as Massey Energy, 
potential ways to reduce the amount of corporate crime committed in the coal mining 
industry, as well as limitations of the current study and directions for future research on 
corporate crime in this area. 
When Does a Miner’s Death Become a Crime? 
As of this writing, none of the former executives at Massey Energy have been 
held criminally responsible for the deaths of the twenty-nine men who perished at the 
UBBM.    In scenarios such as this, it is not uncommon for corporate executives to avoid 
criminal liability because the actions committed by these individuals usually do not 
demonstrate the necessary element of “mens rea” required for most criminal convictions. 
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Mens rea is Latin for “guilty mind” and refers to the concept of criminal intent.  The law 
generally uses the element of mens rea to differentiate between levels of criminal 
culpability.  This is particularly true with laws regarding homicide.  Laws are different 
throughout the world; however, most countries distinguish between murder (having the 
intent to kill) and manslaughter (lacking a prior intention to kill).  So just because these 
corporate actors did not specifically intend for their actions to cause the deaths of twenty-
nine men, does not mean these individuals should be cleared of all criminal culpability.   
The idea of culpable homicide originally came from old English and Scottish law.  
From a legal perspective, culpability describes the degree of one’s blameworthiness in 
the commission of a crime or offense.  What is known as culpable homicide in Scotland, 
or gross negligence manslaughter in England, is referred to as criminally negligent 
manslaughter here in the United States.  Criminally negligent manslaughter occurs when 
there is a death resulting from serious negligence or recklessness.  Negligence refers to 
behaviors that are committed as a result of failure to meet normal recognized 
expectations.  An example of negligence is failing to follow safety regulations that are 
meant to protect human life, which can result in death or injury.  Recklessness refers to 
behaviors that are committed without due caution for human life or property.  Forcing 
employees to work in dangerous conditions or with faulty equipment would be 
considered an instance of recklessness.  Criminally negligent manslaughter also occurs 
when there is a death resulting from an omission to act when one is required by duty to 
do so.  By law, mining companies are required to follow safety protocols that have been 
established to protect the lives of their employees, and it is the company’s duty to follow 
up on safety violations in order to ensure their worker’s safety.  A corporation’s failure to 
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improve working conditions after receiving more than 500 safety violations in the year 
prior to a major disaster can be seen as an omission to act.  Unfortunately, this omission 
to act cost twenty-nine men their lives.  
Even in circumstances where negligence and recklessness are as apparent as in 
this situation, it is still difficult for prosecutors in the United States to convict 
corporations for their criminal behavior.  Although a corporation is defined by law as 
being a juristic person that is capable of committing, and being convicted of and 
sentenced for a criminal offense, American corporations are typically only convicted of 
manslaughter if a single employee is responsible for committing all the elements of the 
offense and is of high enough seniority to be seen as embodying the “mind” of the 
corporation.  This makes the criminal prosecution of a corporation extremely rare, with 
more of a focus being placed on the use of civil action for the purposes of recovering 
monetary damages.  However, in the United Kingdom, the public’s discontent regarding 
culpable corporations, which were seen as escaping the punishment for serious crimes 
they had committed, led to Parliament passing the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act of 2007.  The Act created a new offense named corporate manslaughter 
(corporate homicide in Scotland), which expanded the definition of previous laws to 
incorporate any illegal activities that are managed or organized by a corporation’s senior 
management.  The Act also introduced the enforcement of more severe penalties against 
corporations that were convicted, including fines of to 10% of the company’s total 
revenue.  How long before laws such as this one make it on the books here in the United 
States?  Without massive public support the passing of laws such as these is not likely to 
occur anytime soon in the US.  America is the prime example of a capitalist society, and 
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is the center of the corporate universe.  Powerful corporate lobbyists work hard to ensure 
that new laws will not have an adverse effect on their corporations.  Corporate America 
has such a significant influence on government decisions that passing a law like the 
Corporate Manslaughter Act is not likely to occur without the same public outcry that 
accompanied the passing of this law in the UK.   
The United States has taken strides to prevent the financial and environmental 
crimes committed by corporations with the passing of strict liability laws.  Laws that 
stipulate strict liability, make a corporation legally responsible for the damage caused by 
its acts and omissions, regardless of culpability.  Therefore, the element of mens rea is no 
longer a necessary requirement to establish guilt.  If a corporation commits the act 
without the presence of any due diligence, then it is guilty; the matter of mental state is 
no longer relevant.  Two examples of strict liability laws include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980.   
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new set of standards for all US public company 
boards, management and public accounting firms, and established the strict liability 
enforcement of certain financial crimes.  The bill was the federal government’s reaction 
to a number of major corporate and accounting scandals (Enron, Tyco International, 
Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom), which cost investors billions of dollars 
and shook public confidence in the nation’s securities markets.  The new standards 
incorporated in the act included additional corporate board responsibilities as well as 
enhanced criminal penalties.  Serious financial crimes can carry up to $5 million in fines, 
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and twenty years in prison.  The act also provides for the enforcement of criminal 
penalties if a company participates in any form of retaliation against whistleblowers. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) was designed to hold corporations responsible for environmental damages, 
and is another law based on the principle of strict liability.  CERCLA was enacted by 
Congress in 1980 in response to the threat of hazardous waste sites, such as the Love 
Canal disaster in New York.  Over the first five years, $1.6 billion was collected and 
went to a trust fund for cleaning up these abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste 
sites.  Under CERCLA’s provisions of strict liability, the corporation is responsible for 
their actions whether or not there was intent to cause the outcome.  The only requirement 
is that the Environmental Protection Agency must establish a connection between the 
corporation’s behavior and the outcome in question.  These corporations are then subject 
to fines which may be partitioned into divisible or uniform shares based on the level of 
culpability.  
With all of that said, more needs to be done here in the United States in order to 
protect those who are at the mercy of being victimized by powerful corporations.  Until 
the crimes of the powerful are stopped innocent people will continue to suffer.  There is 
no better example than the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster and the twenty-nine men 
who died as the result of these crimes.  The circumstances surrounding these deaths 
clearly illustrate a company that was behaving in a negligent and reckless manner, and 
was knowingly putting their workers at risk.  Actions that are committed with intent are 
generally considered more serious by our society; however, the actions of negligent and 
reckless corporations can be just as deadly.  Workers who are killed by such behaviors 
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are victims of serious crime, and the corporations responsible for these crimes must be 
held accountable.      
Preventing Corporate Crime in the Coal Mining Industry 
 How do we reduce the amount of corporate crime which is occurring in the coal 
mining industry?  In a perfect world we would be able to reduce the pressures within 
corporations to achieve wealth at any cost, reminding executives about the importance of 
ethics over profit.  Our nation’s business leaders would emphasize doing the right thing 
no matter what the scenario, and that putting workers in harm’s way is never an 
acceptable practice no matter how much profit can be achieved.  However, changing the 
mindset of the corporate world would mean changing the way the U.S. does business, and 
changing American culture itself.  The adoption of a new cultural ethos makes this 
scenario very unlikely.  However, history has shown us that the most effective way of 
controlling crime in the coal mining industry is through enforcement reform.  Even 
though we know that increases in regulatory enforcement usually arrive only after a 
major disaster has already taken place, studies have shown that these increases in 
enforcement usually have a positive effect on reducing the level of future violations 
(Wallace, 1987).  Policy reform within the regulatory agencies and the addition of several 
safety practices at the mine level could go a long way toward preventing disasters such as 
this from occurring in the future.   
 Reducing opportunities for deviance in criminogenic situations can only be 
achieved if a regulatory agency has meaningful oversight powers and is dedicated to 
recognizing the potential for deviant behavior.  In order to accomplish this, the current 
regulatory enforcement system must be reformed, undergoing three major changes.  First 
78 
 
of all, the current agencies must be provided with greater resources in order to compete 
with their corporate counterparts.  Next, a greater effort must be undertaken to isolate 
these agencies from outside political pressures.  Finally, the current system of fines and 
penalties needs to be restructured in order to have any type of deterrence effect.  
 The need for greater resources is paramount amongst regulatory agencies in the 
coal mining industry.  Currently, regulatory agencies and prosecutors are hopelessly 
outmatched by their corporate opponents, who oftentimes command larger and more 
skilled legal staffs that are backed with much greater financial support.  In particular, 
under staffing at the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission has allowed 
corporations to prolong the appeals process, and bog down the agency.  This is evident by 
the backlog of more 16,000 unresolved cases that are currently awaiting review by the 
commission.  In addition, a lack of government inspectors allows only a small fraction of 
health and safety violations to be detected.  In order to remedy this situation, regulatory 
and enforcement agencies should be provided with substantial increases to their budgets.  
The most pressing needs are for larger research budgets that would allow the agencies to 
actively search out and neutralize health and safety threats before disaster strikes, as well 
as increased pay for investigators and prosecutors, along with legal, medical, and 
scientific personnel who are often lured away to better-paying jobs in the private 
industry.  Increased pay for mine inspectors will also help offset the financial pressures to 
accept bribes and pay-outs.  Greater support is also needed for local agencies that 
oftentimes bear the responsibility for investigating occupational crimes.      
 An increase in resources must also be accompanied by a greater effort to isolate 
enforcement agencies from exterior political pressure.  In order to diminish the 
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opportunities for bribes of regulatory officials, and defuse the threat of punitive 
budgetary cutbacks for agencies that offend powerful special interests, regulatory 
agencies must become more self-supportive. This means that regulatory agencies must 
find a way to finance themselves without having to rely as much on monetary support 
from the federal government.  This could be partially achieved by new legislation that 
requires convicted offenders to not only pay their penalties in full, but also pay for the 
cost of the government’s investigation and prosecution.  This would also likely reduce the 
number of cases being contested by corporations, providing relief for the currently 
backlogged appeals process.  In addition, special fees could be assessed on corporations 
that are constantly in violation of health and safety protocols and require higher levels of 
supervision. 
 Finally, the current system of fines and penalties is in need of restructuring.  Far 
too often, penalties that are assessed by regulatory agencies do not pose a credible threat 
to a corporation’s bottom line, and as a result do not have any type of deterrent effect.  
Most importantly, repeat offenses for the same violation should received increased fines.  
A mine’s hundredth violation for the buildup of explosive materials, should not carry the 
same fine as its first violation for the buildup of explosive materials.  The amount of the 
fine should increase every time the mine is cited for the same violation.  In addition, 
regulatory agencies need to have enhanced powers to shut down dangerous mines that are 
in gross violation of health and safety standards.  The current “pattern of violation” 
system is too long of a process to begin with and is further slowed by a corporation’s 
ability to contest violations.  By the time it takes the MSHA to order a mine to be closed, 
it is likely that the mine will have already been completely stripped and abandoned, or 
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worse a major disaster will have already occurred.  In order to prevent these types of 
catastrophes, mine inspectors should be allowed to close down parts of a mine until all 
safety issues have been resolved and the inspector decides that work should be permitted 
to continue.  What good is issuing a safety citation, if the company does nothing to 
correct the problem being cited?  Lastly, larger penalties, such as the flagrant violation 
citation that is currently in use and carries a fine of up to $220,000, should be issued 
automatically and should not be based on a mine inspector’s discretion.  Issuing fines this 
large puts tremendous pressure on the mine inspector, and opens the door for unethical 
activity, such as bribes, to occur.  Instead companies should automatically be issued these 
flagrant citations, after reaching a certain amount of violations.  
 Even with stronger enforcement, there will still be mine operators that continue to 
break the law in regards to miner safety.  In situations such as these, miners need to have 
the ability to report unsafe working conditions in their mines, which may have been 
missed or overlooked by mine inspectors.  The establishment and promotion of an 
anonymous hotline would allow miners to report dangerous practices without having to 
fear retaliation.  It is important that miners have the option to report anonymously, 
because as mentioned in chapter five, the intimidation of workers can cause miners to 
follow along with deviant practices.  In addition, the results of all mine inspections 
should be made readily available to all the miners working in that mine, and miners 
should be notified immediately if they are working in a mine that has failed to meet 
minimal safety requirements (like the UBBM).  In order to prevent institutional secrecy, 
miners must be made aware of all the circumstances surrounding their work environment.  
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 Similar to many of the previous studies on corporate crime, this paper utilizes a 
case study format in order to analyze the crimes of the powerful.  Although this method 
has proven successful in detailing the unfamiliar crimes committed by corporations and 
their actors, this method is also somewhat flawed in its own right.  Because of the 
sensational nature of many case studies, this technique will frequently only capture the 
high-profile or unusually harmful crimes committed by corporations.  As a result, these 
extraordinary cases may not share the same characteristics of the more typical types of 
criminal activity that take place amongst corporations.  Future research should look to 
explain a wider array of issues that may be causing systematic problems within the coal 
mining industry as a whole.  For example, researchers may want to further investigate the 
effects that contested citations are having on the MSHA’s ability to regulate mining 
companies. 
 Another limitation of case studies, including this one, is that the theoretical 
frameworks applied to many case studies are not supported by empirical research.  This is 
a common issue within the field of corporate crime research, because many of the 
theoretical explanations used for explaining the crimes of the powerful consist of 
concepts that are difficult to measure.  Future researchers should attempt to 
operationalize theoretical concepts, such as maximization, in order to measure their 
existence within corporate structures.  In addition, data for corporate crime is very sparse 
and extremely difficult to acquire.  Not only do most corporate crimes go unreported, but 
most of the data that are needed to study these crimes can only be discovered by 
analyzing a corporation’s records, which are typically not made available to the public.  
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As far as the data on mining is concerned, other than basic statistics on the number of 
citations and the amount of penalties imposed against mines, there is very little data that 
exists, almost none of which can be used to measure any of these sophisticated theoretical 
principles.  Hopefully, future researchers will have access to more useful data, and can 
utilize empirical research to explain the crimes of the powerful that are laid out in 
narratives such as this.    
It is important to continue studying corporate crime within the coal mining 
industry in order to prevent disasters like the one presented earlier. If it were not for the 
negligence of an unchecked corporation that put profits ahead of safety, twenty-nine 
miners would likely still be alive today.  I believe that President Obama put it best in his 
closing remarks to the victims’ families of the Upper Big Branch mine disaster: 
I think we all understand that underground coal mining is, by its 
very nature, dangerous. Every miner and every mining family 
understands this. But we know what can cause mine explosions, 
and we know how to prevent them. I refuse to accept any number 
of miner deaths as simply a cost of doing business. We can’t 
eliminate chance completely from mining any more than we can 
from life itself. But if a tragedy can be prevented, it must be 
prevented. That’s the responsibility of mine operators. That’s the 
responsibility of government. And that is the responsibility that 
we’re all going to have to work together to meet in the future 
(White House Press Release, 2010). 
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